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Several major cascading outages have involved mis-operation or mis-
coordination of protective relays during stressed system conditions that re-
sulted in a vulnerable network. Such stressed conditions include concurrent
high load demand, changes in circuit topology, equipment outages, and short-
circuit faults. With levels of wind and photovoltaic (PV) generation projected
to increase in the future, large-scale variable generation also presents an ad-
ditional point of vulnerability to the existing protection system. In this work,
a new framework is introduced that is built on model-based distributed relay
intelligence. The framework integrates real-time measurements from adjacent
buses and predictive circuit models embedded in relays. The data collected by
the relay is input to circuit simulations in order to accurately predict possible
fault conditions at the relay location. Settings can then be adapted in real-
time based on prevailing system conditions. Several scenarios are evaluated
vi
to demonstrate the e↵ectiveness of this approach. This work further devel-
ops a probabilistic formulation of optimal relay characteristics that adapts to
the randomness and uncertainty introduced by renewable generation. In this
framework, the calculation of relay operating times is formulated as a stochas-
tic optimization problem. In addition, at the system level, a mixed-integer
linear program is developed for protective device and switch allocation consid-
ering intentional islanding with distributed generation in distribution systems.
vii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements xi
Abstract xi
List of Tables xii
List of Figures xvii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Research Approach and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.1 Model-Based Distributed Intelligence Framework . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2 Supervised Classification of Power Swings . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.3 Optimal Overcurrent Relay Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.4 Optimal Protective Device Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2 Model-Based Relaying Framework 13
2.1 MBDI for Mitigation of Cascading Outages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Case Studies in a Small Transmission Network . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.1 Test System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.2 Fault Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
viii
2.2.3 Case Studies for Stressed System Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.4 Conclusion from Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3 Supervision of Power Swing Blocking Using MBDI 36
3.1 Conventional Impedance-based PSB Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1.1 Impedance Measured by Distance Relay During Power Swings
and Out-of-step Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1.2 Impedance-based PSB Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.1.3 Issues with Traditional Impedance-based PSB Methods . . . 40
3.2 Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2.1 Scenario 1: Conventional Operation of PSB and MBDI . . . 41
3.2.2 Scenario 2: Fast Power Swing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.3 Scenario 3: Slow Power Swing and Three-Phase Fault . . . . 45
3.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4 Hardware Development and Design 49
4.1 Prototype Design and Component Selection Basis . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2 Relay Input Signals and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2.1 Analog-to-Digital Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3 Distributed Power Flow Solver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4 Power System Test Bed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.5 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5 Supervised Learning for Symmetrical Fault Detection During Power
Swings 60
5.1 Proposed Classification Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.1.1 Generating Training Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
ix
5.1.2 Feature Importance Ranking by Mutual Information . . . . . 65
5.1.3 Classification Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.2 Model Evaluation and Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6 Stochastic Optimization of Discrete Overcurrent Relay Character-
istics 75
6.1 Proposed Stochastic Optimization Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.1.1 Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.1.2 Explanation of Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.2 Case Study: Simple Radial Test System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.2.1 Illustrative Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.2.2 Comparison with Conventional Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.2.3 Comparison With Parameter Optimization Approach . . . . 90
6.3 Case Study: IEEE 34-Node Feeder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.3.1 Probabilistic Fault Scenarios with DG . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.3.2 Optimal Tripping Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7 Optimal Allocation of Protective Devices in Distribution Systems 98
7.1 Notation and Data Preprocessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
7.1.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.1.2 Protection Capabilities of Each Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
7.1.3 Graph Representation of Distribution Systems . . . . . . . . 103
7.1.4 Feasible Sets for Restoration Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.2 Proposed Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
x
7.2.1 Objective Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.2.2 Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.3 Case study: 10-node feeder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.3.1 Example Solution and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
7.3.2 Impact of Varying Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.3.3 Impact of DG Location and Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.4 Case Study: 58-Node RBTS System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.4.1 Comparison of Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
8 Conclusions 125
References 128
Vita 137
xi
List of Tables
1.1 Summary of protection system involvement in major outages . . . . 4
4.1 Average solution times for selected test feeders . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.1 Feature sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.2 Tuned parameters for each classifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.3 Classification accuracy using five features with highest mutual infor-
mation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.1 System Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.2 Two fault scenario data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.3 Relay Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.4 Simplified fault scenario data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.5 Comparison of Optimal Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.6 Total Expected Energy Loss From Relay Operations . . . . . . . . . 92
7.1 Protection Capabilities of Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
7.2 Comparison with prior solutions For 58-Node System . . . . . . . . . 122
xii
List of Figures
1.1 Scale of recent major outages worldwide in terms of load and cus-
tomers impacted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Example of relay coverage for three distance protection zones. The
load encroachment is shown where the load region enters the relay’s
operating region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Conceptual illustration of a supervisory layer for relay intelligence. . 9
2.1 Block diagrams comparing (a) centralized intelligence of existing pro-
tection schemes and (b) the proposed scheme with distributed intel-
ligence and optimal supervisory decision logic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Overall flowchart of the MBDI algorithm shown in (a) and simulation
subroutine in (b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Single-line diagram of test system and validation fault scenarios. . . 20
2.4 Apparent impedance comparison for Zone 3 fault scenario. MBDI
simulation in (b) closely matches Zone 3 fault impedance in (a). . . 21
2.5 Zone 3 fault scenario: (a) Absolute error between measured and sim-
ulated bus voltages magnitudes and (b) and sequence of signals. . . 23
2.6 Apparent impedance comparison for load encroachment scenario, with
load encroachment impedance in (a) and MBDI fault simulation in (b). 25
xiii
2.7 Load Encroachment scenario: (a) Absolute error between measured
and simulated bus voltages magnitudes (b) and sequence of signals. . 27
2.8 Apparent impedance comparison for voltage excursion scenario, with
measured impedance in (a) and MBDI fault simulation in (b). . . . . 28
2.9 Absolute error between measured and simulated bus voltages magni-
tudes (a) and sequence of trip signals (b). The relay does not trip
under voltage excursion because measured and simulated voltages do
not converge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.10 Single-line diagram of for high resistance fault scenario. . . . . . . . 31
2.11 Apparent impedance comparison for high resistance fault scenario,
with measured impedance in (a) and MBDI fault simulation in (b).
Load encroachment blocking region is shown in (a). . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.12 Absolute error between measured and simulated bus voltages magni-
tudes (a) and sequence of signals (b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1 Tie-line connected between two areas. Distance relay A is installed
at Bus A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2 Trajectory of power swing in complex impedance plane and PSB
scheme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Scenario 1: Slow power swing where PSB correctly issues blocking
signal and MBDI correctly does not issue trip. . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.4 Scenario 1: Zone 2 fault where PSB does not block and MBDI cor-
rectly confirms a fault. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.5 Scenario 2: Impedance trajectory of fast swing, moving left to right,
showing impedance crossing Zones 2 and 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.6 Scenario 2: PSB does not detect the swing due to fast slip frequency.
MBDI logic does not confirm fault in Zone 3 and Zone 3 is blocked. 46
xiv
3.7 Scenario 3: Impedance trajectory shows fault in Zone 3 after PSB
has issued blocking signal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.8 Scenario 3: A Slow swing is followed by a three-phase fault in Zone
3. PSB is blocking all zones, however, MBDI simulations confirm a
Zone 3 fault. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.1 Typical numerical relay design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2 Block diagram of proposed MBDI relay design. Conventional relay
architecture is shown with black outline. Proposed modules to be
integrated are shown in light blue outline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3 Schematic of power system test bed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.4 Power system test bed developed at the University of Texas at Austin. 57
4.5 Fault application enclosure for safely applying various fault conditions
to the experimental power grid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.6 Raspberry Pi 2 and TI ADC used to implement prototype. . . . . . 59
4.7 Fault current and MBDI supervisory signal captured for a Zone 2
fault at 100% line impedance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.1 Single line diagram of WSCC 9-Bus system showing steady state
power flow solution and location of fault simulations. . . . . . . . . . 63
5.2 Mutual information score for 12 features described in Table I. . . . . 65
5.3 Scatter matrix comparing 12 features for both power swings and
faults. Power swings are shown in blue and symmetrical faults in
red. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.4 ROC and AUROC comparing e↵ectiveness of each classifier. . . . . . 72
xv
5.5 Classifier output for one power swing scenario. Voltage and current
waveforms, predicted class, and predicted probability shown in (a).
Corresponding impedance plane trajectories shown in (b). . . . . . 73
5.6 Classification error rate on test set as a function of the number of
input features. Features are added sequentially in order of decreasing
importance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.7 Predicted probability contours for random forest classifier. Data for
faults and power swings are shown from training set. . . . . . . . . . 74
6.1 Conceptual illustration with conventional curve on left and proposed
approach on right where the characteristic of relay i is determined by
optimizing tripping time tij for each jth current interval. . . . . . . 78
6.2 Single-line diagram of a simplified radial distribution system. . . . . 85
6.3 Comparison of proposed optimal tripping characteristic with param-
eter optimization of TCC curves approach. The proposed approach
provides faster operating times for all fault currents. . . . . . . . . . 91
6.4 IEEE 34-node test feeder with modified protection and DG locations. 93
6.5 Distribution of fault currents observed at each relay for 10 000 Monte
Carlo fault scenarios are shown for (a) 14% and (b) 100% maximum
irradiance scenarios for a 700 kW distributed generator at node 850.
The corresponding optimal characteristics are shown with   = 1.5.
in (c) and (d), respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.1 For a fault at node i in an example radial feeder, the four sets of
nodes shown in (a)-(d) are used to model the impact of protective
device operations. Shaded nodes are included in the set. . . . . . . . 105
7.2 Solution of modified 10-node example with budget of 45 units. . . . 117
xvi
7.3 Cost – Budget Plot of modified 10-node system. . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.4 Impact of the capacity and location of a single DG on the objective
function, total expected cost of reliability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7.5 Impact of the capacity and location of three DGs of the same size on
the total expected cost of reliability. A total of 120 node triplets are
shown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.6 MILP** solution in RBTS Bus 4 test system allowing for circuit
breakers, reclosers, sectionalizers, and ISs. A maximum of 12 ISs
or sectionalizers are allowed and the device budget constraint has
been removed. The comparison with a prior solution is shown with a
plus sign next to each node. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
xvii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Protective relays play a critical role in the power system at all levels, including
power generation, transmission, and distribution. Because these devices control the
actuation of circuit breakers, relays must operate with high reliability and selec-
tively isolate faulted sections. Furthermore, existing power systems are growing in
complexity and are operating with more uncertainty due to increasing renewable
generation. This chapter presents the motivation and background for leveraging
increased computational power to enhance the reliability and security of protective
relay operations. The chapter concludes with an outline of the research objectives
and a description of the specific research approaches to address the objectives and
their contributions.
1.1 Background and Motivation
The ability of protective relays to accurately identify and quickly isolate short-circuit
faults is integral to maintaining a reliable and stable power system. However, it
can be challenging to maintain coordination of remote backup protection, such as
Zone 3 distance elements, in the presence of stressed system conditions. History
has shown that several major cascading outages have involved mis-operation or
1
mis-coordination of protective relays [1–5]. For example, a Zone 3 mis-coordination
ultimately triggered a massive cascading outage in 2003, the largest in the history of
North America now called the Northeast blackout [6,7]. Similarly, in 2006, improper
relay coordination was a key cause in initiating the largest blackout in Europe [8,9].
Table 1.1 and Fig. 1.1 summarize the scale of the recent major outages and the
involvement of the protective relaying system as found in [10–12]. These outages
demonstrate that coordination of remote backup zones in stepped-distance protec-
tion can be vulnerable during stressed conditions in which several events coincide,
such as high load demand, changes in circuit topology, equipment outages, and
short-circuit fault conditions. Furthermore, existing relay setting philosophies are
generally biased to be more sensitive to any possible disturbances (high depend-
ability). This approach can result in false positives (lower security) especially when
the system is stressed [13]. An incorrect response by a relay during critical stressed
conditions can further propagate a disturbance.
Additionally, during past major blackouts, variable generation from renewable
energy resources was at a significantly lower level than at present. With levels of
wind and photovoltaic (PV) generation projected only to increase in the future, e.g.,
20% wind energy by the year 2030 [14–16], large-scale renewable energy generation
can potentially introduce additional variation and uncertainty into system behavior.
In conventional power networks, each generator’s fault current contribution can be
approximated as constant due to the controllable nature of the generators’ output.
This allows existing protection methodologies to calculate the appropriate response
parameters of protective relays with high certainty in the expected worst-case fault
conditions. Furthermore, because the worst-case system fault characteristics do not
change significantly over time, relay settings can be static and do not need to be up-
dated often once they have been set. However, wind and PV generation introduces
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variability in power flows and short-circuit contributions not present in classical
power networks. Wind and PV are characterized by variable output, minimal iner-
tia, and fault current contribution that varies with the output [17–19]. Therefore,
classical protection methodologies with static relay settings in the presence of high
wind and PV penetration can lead to mis-coordination and unintended operations.
Although state-of-the-art protection schemes utilizing phasor measurement units
(PMUs) and adaptive relaying [4, 20] have made e↵orts to alleviate these issues,
power system protection theory has lagged the pace of grid development and renew-
able integration. Furthermore, existing solutions aim at solving issues individually
as they are encountered.
Year
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Figure 1.1: Scale of recent major outages worldwide in terms of load and customers
impacted.
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Table 1.1: Summary of protection system involvement in major outages
Location Date System Loading Prior to Outage Event Trigger Misoperation Type
Protective
Element
Northeast Nov. 9, 1965 Only a few lines heavily loaded Load encroachment Improper relay settings Distance
WSCC Jul. 2, 1996
High demand and large power flows
due to hot weather
Tree contact Zone 3 Distance
WSCC Aug. 10, 1996
High demand and large power flows
due to hot weather
Tree contact Improper application
Directional
phase
overcurrent
North America Aug. 14, 2003
Large power flows due to generator
trip
Load encroachment Zone 3 Distance
Sweden/Denmark Sep. 23, 2003 Moderate loading of system
Trip of large power
plant
N/A N/A
Italy Sep. 28, 2003 Critical lines heavily loaded Tree contact N/A N/A
UTCE Nov. 4, 2006 Critical lines heavily loaded Load encroachment Improper relay settings Distance
WECC Sep. 8, 2011
High loading during peak demand
hours
Voltage instability Coordination and Zone 3 Distance
India Jul. 30/31, 2012
Large power flows due to unsched-
uled interchanges and forced out-
ages
Load encroachment and
Fault
Zone 3 Distance
Moreover, conventional power system protection approaches consider completely
dispatchable generation, central management of static relay settings, and relays
without capabilities for real-time awareness of system topology changes or large-
scale generation swings [21, 22]. The primary purpose of protective relaying is to
quickly detect faults in the protected zone and isolate the faulted section by opening
a circuit breaker. There are several relay functions which help accomplish this goal,
however, in this work, the focus will be on two of the most common: distance and
overcurrent relays. Distance relays use local voltage and current measurements to
calculate apparent impedance, allowing detection of faults in the complex impedance
plane. The relay coverage is divided into zones and the coverage of each zone is
calculated by a predetermined percentage of the line impedance, as shown in Fig.
1.2. Overcurrent relays respond to the magnitude of local current measurements.
Coordination between overcurrent relays is achieved by an intentional time delay
that is inversely proportional to the measured current.
Remote backup protection for distance relays, such as Zone 3, is only intended
to operate in the case where the primary protective device at the remote end of an
adjacent transmission line fails to clear a fault. However, load flowing through a
4
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Figure 1.2: Example of relay coverage for three distance protection zones. The load
encroachment is shown where the load region enters the relay’s operating region.
transmission line also appears as impedance to the distance relay and is typically
higher compared to the zone setting under normal loading conditions. When the
network is heavily loaded, the apparent impedance can enter into the backup pro-
tection Zone 3 characteristic and trip the relay, causing an unwanted line outage.
System conditions involving depressed voltages and high power flows have been a
contributing cause of several major outages. Modern relays can implement specific
functions to avoid tripping under conditions resembling faults (high power flows
and depressed voltages), such as load encroachment blocking and power swing de-
tection [23]. However, even with careful planning, these methods can still result in
mis-coordination in complex protection schemes [13].
Recent e↵orts to improve remote backup protection involves utilizing wide-area
measurements from phasor measurement units (PMUs). PMUs measure voltages
and currents with accurate time stamping using a GPS time reference signal. These
PMUs can be installed at critical locations across the power grid allowing for an
operator to visualize the exact angular di↵erence between locations in real-time and
5
can be used to assess system conditions such as frequency changes and power flows
[4]. Some specific applications as stated in [4] include: state-estimation and real-
time monitoring, voltage instability prediction, system model validation, adaptive
relaying, and adaptive load shedding. PMUs can also be utilized for prevention of
Zone 3 mis-operation under stressed power system conditions as shown in [20,24].
In addition, because conventional protection relays employ static settings that
are calculated from expected system conditions, settings may no longer be appropri-
ate when distributed generation output changes, system topology changes, or fault
conditions change. Therefore, adaptive relaying has been the practice of changing
the relay’s operating characteristics based on the present system condition. Applica-
tions of adaptive relaying utilizing phasor measurements such as adaptive out-of-step
protection and the adaptive voting scheme have been reported in [20,25] to discrim-
inate between stable and unstable power swings. One commonly accepted method
for adaptive relaying uses three relays in a voting scheme [12]. Building on this
approach, [26] presents a decision tree based adaptive relaying scheme, which classi-
fies system state using decision trees and predict the optimal security-dependability
bias. These methods, however, rely on centralized analysis of system PMU measure-
ments. This philosophy can be e cient for determining relay settings for a small
number of protective devices, but a transmission network can consist of thousands
of buses. In the distribution system, short-circuit faults are detected by relays that
strictly measure fault current. Distributed generation can cause bidirectional power
flow, resulting in mis-coordination between relays.
Determination of relay settings and coordination as part of an optimization
framework was first introduced in [27]. In this formulation, the weighted sum of
relay operation times in a given zone is minimized over the time-dial and pickup
settings for directional overcurrent relays. Constraints are included for coordina-
6
tion between primary and backup relays, bounds for relay settings, and inverse-time
characteristics. This framework is further developed in [28–31], where optimal set-
tings for overcurrent relays is defined for minimum of the total sum of operating
times. The problem formulation as presented in [31], is summarized below.
Minimize : J =
nX
i=1
witi (1.1)
where ti is the time delay of relay i for a near-end fault and n is the number of
relays. The weight wi correspond to the likelihood a fault occurs in a given zone,
with all weights typically set to one. The following constraint governs coordination
between the primary and backup relays:
tj   ti   CTI 8(i, j) 2 ⌦ (1.2)
where ⌦ is the set of primary/backup pairs of relays, with ti and tj being the oper-
ating times for the primary and backup relays respectively. The coordination time
interval (CTI) provides the margin between primary and backup relay operating
times and is typically a constant between 0.2 and 0.5 s. In general, the operating
time of an overcurrent relay can be expressed as:
ti = fi(Ifi, Ipui)⇥ TDSi (1.3)
where fi is a nonlinear function of Ifi and Ipui, Ifi is the fault current seen by the
relay, Ipui is the pick-up setting of the relay, and TDSi is the time-dial setting of
the relay. A typical equation for fi has the form:
fi =
1
C
24 A
(
Ifi
Ipui
)2   1
+B
35⇥ TDSi (1.4)
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Although the above formulation and other similar methods allow for calculation
of relay settings under an optimization framework, there are limitations. Their focus
is to determine optimal device settings and improve upon automated approaches of
the classical manual relay setting procedure. However, notably, the methods do not
consider the stochastic nature of renewable energy sources or consider adaptation
of settings based on real-time system conditions.
1.2 Objectives
The research presented in this dissertation aims to meet two key objectives: secure
transmission protection in the presence of uncertainty introduced by stressed con-
ditions and optimal distribution protection in the presence of renewable distributed
generation. Each objective is described below.
Transmission Protection: Secure Relay Operation
The first objective focuses on secure transmission protection in the presence of un-
certainty introduced by stressed conditions. The goal of this objective is to enhance
security of the remote backup protection function by developing the following capa-
bilities in individual relays: awareness of system state, real-time dynamic settings,
and secure operation during stressed system conditions. With this scheme, the
relay’s trip or block decision is supervised and validated by real-time simulation
results to maintain coordination with other relays when stressed system conditions
are present. A conceptual overview of the proposed solution is illustrated in Fig.
1.3. Existing protection methods only interact between the physical, measurement,
and decision layers. The proposed framework adds a supervisory relay intelligence
layer to operate and supervise in real-time at the local relay level. Furthermore, the
goal includes development of a prototype relay in hardware capable of implementing
8
the proposed protection framework.
Figure 1.3: Conceptual illustration of a supervisory layer for relay intelligence.
Distribution Protection: Optimal Performance and Reliability
The second objective focuses on optimal distribution protection in the presence
of renewable distributed generation. A high penetration of distributed generators
(DGs) can a↵ect fault current levels, contributing to protection coordination issues
in fault detection and loss of selectivity. The first goal of this objective focuses on the
device-level operating characteristics and the calculation of relay operating settings
formulated as a stochastic optimization problem. The problem formulation defines a
cost-based objective function that aims to minimize the impact of opening a circuit
breaker given the uncertainty in the fault current observed at each relay, which can
be impacted by fault location, fault resistance, breaker failure, and DG output. The
optimization allows the relay to make the best possible decision based on known
information (system structure and local measurements) and estimated values (non-
local conditions). The second goal of this objective focuses on the system-level and
the optimal allocation of protective devices in a distribution system considering
intentional islanding with DGs.
9
1.3 Research Approach and Contributions
The specific research approaches taken to address the above objectives is organized
into four areas. The first and second approaches address the objective of secure
transmission protection and the third and fourth approaches address the objective
of optimal distribution protection. Each approach and the associated contributions
are described below.
1.3.1 Model-Based Distributed Intelligence Framework
Several major outages have been traced to the failure of remote backup protec-
tion elements in distance relays. Experience has shown that coordination of remote
backup zones in stepped-distance protection can be vulnerable during stressed con-
ditions. Furthermore, relay settings are typically biased for high dependability,
resulting in lower security especially when several unexpected events coincide. An
incorrect response by a relay during such a condition can trigger or propagate the
disturbance. Therefore, a new framework for Model-Based Relaying is introduced
to supervise and secure the operation of remote backup protection elements, such
as Zone 3 [32–34].
The framework utilizes the fact that while a single relay can observe a 3-phase
fault or stressed system condition with similar apparent impedances, other system
parameters will be significantly di↵erent. Therefore, the framework proposes to
include the capability in relays to quickly run circuit model simulations at the re-
lay level. The proposed method aims to work in parallel with and supervise the
conventional distance relay’s zone 3 for discrimination between 3-phase faults and
stressed conditions using the output of local circuit model simulations. Several case
studies are evaluated to demonstrate that dependability is not degraded for true
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fault conditions and security is enhanced for stressed system conditions.
1.3.2 Supervised Classification of Power Swings
Distance relay operation due to power swing conditions should be blocked in order to
prevent unnecessary line trips leading to the formation of unplanned islands and the
propagation of outages. A supervised classification approach is presented to improve
the detection of symmetrical faults during power swing conditions in conventional
distance relays [35]. The approach is intended to augment existing power swing
blocking methods and trains a classifier with a focus on accuracy and interpretabil-
ity. The contribution of the approach is the training of classifiers that maintain
performance of other methods, while providing interpretable results. Training and
test data is generated from time-domain simulations of the IEEE 9-Bus system for
17 280 scenarios. The following classifiers are compared and evaluated: support
vector machine, random forest, gradient tree boosting, decision tree, and k-nearest
neighbors. Utilizing mutual information for feature selection and only local mea-
surements, the results show performance comparable to prior methods and provides
the ability to view the decision boundary for greater understanding of the classifier
output. Trade-o↵s between interpretability and performance are also assessed.
1.3.3 Optimal Overcurrent Relay Characteristics
The inverse-time operating characteristic of overcurrent relays is the primary pro-
tective element in distribution system protection schemes and has been utilized for
several decades. As the distribution system becomes increasingly complex due to
the growth of distributed generation, the protection task based on existing method-
ologies will become more di cult. Faster relay operating times while maintaining
selectivity is critical. In this approach, a stochastic mixed-integer linear program is
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formulated to minimize a relay’s tripping time at discrete fault current intervals and
considers the cost of tripping a relay as the objective function [36]. The formulation
takes into account the probabilistic nature of the fault current observed at each
relay, which can be impacted by fault location, fault resistance, device failure, and
DG output. Monte Carlo simulation is used to determine the empirical probabilities
of each relay observing a particular fault current. Probabilistic fault scenarios are
simulated on the IEEE 34-Node test feeder. The proposed approach shows a de-
crease in expected energy loss due to faults up to 11.5% compared to conventional
TCC curves for 10 000 Monte Carlo fault scenarios.
1.3.4 Optimal Protective Device Allocation
The location of protective devices, such as circuit breakers, reclosers, sectionalizers,
and fuses, along with isolating switches in a distribution network is a key factor
impacting the reliability performance. Furthermore, automatic restoration from in-
tentional islanding with distributed generators (DGs) or from alternate feeders can
reduce outage times. A mixed-integer linear program (MILP) formulation is pro-
posed for protective device and switch allocation considering intentional islanding
with distributed generation in distribution systems [37]. The specific impact of each
protective device type and isolating switch is modeled, e.g., momentary interrup-
tions caused by reclosers. E cient graph search algorithms combined with a directed
graph representation of the distribution system allows for pre-processing of the net-
work data and facilitates the formulation of an MILP. The formulation is able to
e ciently compute optimal device allocations for multiple scenarios, revealing key
insights, e.g., the location and capacity of DGs providing the greatest reliability
benefit for a fixed protection budget. Tests on realistic feeders and comparison with
prior solutions shows improved allocations and lower objective function values.
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Chapter 2
Model-Based Relaying
Framework
Protective relaying is integral to maintaining power system reliability. However,
it can be challenging to maintain coordination of remote backup protection zone
3 distance elements in the presence of stressed system conditions. Zone 3 misop-
erations occur during stressed system conditions where the measured impedance
enters the operating characteristic and the relay is unable to discriminate between
a 3-phase fault and a wide-area stressed condition. In part, the vulnerability lies
in the fact that conventional relays only rely on local voltage and current measure-
ments. Recent e↵orts in the literature have proposed using various types of wide
area measurements to help make the zone 3 decision more secure. In [38], a scheme
is presented where relay and breaker status of nearby lines are used to supervise
zone 3. However, this requires that those remote devices operate securely. Syn-
chrophasors are used in [39] and [40] to supervise relay decisions, however, these
schemes require data to be streamed to a central location, where decisions can be
directed to multiple devices. If a failure occurs at the central location, the scheme
can be disabled for all relays.
In this chapter, a new framework is proposed for secure remote backup protec-
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tion, utilizing only bus voltage magnitudes from adjacent buses to supervise the zone
3 decision. This is accomplished by comparing measured bus voltage magnitudes at
adjacent buses and comparing with those during possible fault scenarios - with all
computation done at the local relay level. The framework is termed Model-Based
Distributed Intelligence (MBDI) because it integrates, at the relay level, real-time
knowledge of the network structure and system state in the form of predictive cir-
cuit models. This approach takes advantage of advances in computing available
to numerical relays today, such as improved processing power and communications
capabilities. Under the MBDI framework, a solution is provided that can supervise
relay decisions and prevent undesired relay operations. The calculation of relay op-
erating settings is formulated with real-time measurements and the data collected
by the relay is input to circuit model simulations in order to accurately predict real-
time fault currents at the relay location. With this scheme, the relay’s trip or block
decision is supervised and validated by real-time simulation results to autonomously
maintain coordination with other relays when stressed system conditions are present.
2.1 MBDI for Mitigation of Cascading Outages
Figure 2.1 presents a block diagram that compares existing methodologies to the
one proposed. Under existing methodologies, the relays in Fig. 2.1a are set based on
expected worse-case fault calculations that are done centrally. In Fig. 2.1b, relays
are equipped with model-based distributed intelligence that reduces the uncertainty
in each relay’s assessment of the present system condition. It accomplishes this
through the supervisory layer composed of a simulation circuit model and decision
logic. The extent of the simulation model includes all adjacent buses to the relay,
resulting in a total number of k buses modeled in the simulation circuit model. Any
parts of the power system outside these k buses are modeled by their Thevenin
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equivalent circuits. The objective of the supervisory layer is to confirm or reject the
perceived system state (normal or fault) and determine optimal operating times.
Measured system parameters are continuously streamed to the simulation circuit
model. Under secure operation, the relay should only send a trip signal for true fault
conditions in protected zones. The circuit model simulations provide an estimate
of expected system values, such as voltages and power flows, at other buses in the
presence of varying output. Because calculation of the relays settings are done in
real-time at each individual relay under the proposed framework, the protection
system can dynamically respond to changes in generation output.
(a) centralized intelligence
(b) distributed intelligence
Figure 2.1: Block diagrams comparing (a) centralized intelligence of existing protec-
tion schemes and (b) the proposed scheme with distributed intelligence and optimal
supervisory decision logic.
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In this section, the framework for integrating circuit structure information at
the relay level is introduced and the results from several case studies are presented.
Several fields of engineering and science have utilized system models to make de-
cisions in real-time. For example, model-predictive control in control theory and
model-based reasoning in artificial intelligence are well developed methods. In these
schemes, models approximating the system are used to influence control decisions.
In the area of power systems, protective relaying is a field that could immensely
benefit from further development in this type of approach.
In existing protection methodologies, the backup protection element and time
delay settings are determined based on the results of extensive fault studies com-
puted on a model of the system in which the relay will be deployed. However, the
system model is only a close representation of the actual system and relay settings
are chosen to accommodate worst case fault scenarios and uncertainty in the model
parameters [21, 22]. The proposed MBDI framework aims to decentralize or dis-
tribute the intelligence intrinsic to the system model and integrate it at the relay
level to supervise remote backup protection operations. Incorporating knowledge
of the circuit model at the relay level is important because circuit parameters do
not change significantly across operating conditions, while power flows and voltage
levels will vary with the system state (faults, stressed conditions, etc.).
Therefore, the key contribution of the MBDI framework for remote backup pro-
tection is the integration of circuit models at the relay and the ability to simulate
possible fault scenarios locally using real-time measurements. MBDI further facili-
tates calculation of an expected system state as observed system parameters change.
The simulation results for possible fault scenarios can then be compared against real-
time system measurements to assess if there is a match within a specified tolerance.
MBDI simulations can also include fault scenarios where relay or circuit breaker fail-
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ures necessitate operation of the remote backup protection element. Subsequently,
the MBDI framework is identical to existing standard industry practices for Zone 1
and Zone 2 setting, but makes use of real-time knowledge of the network structure
and system state for Zone 3 operations.
A simplified flowchart of the full MBDI algorithm is presented in Fig. 2.2.
For a system with N buses, let k be the bus where the MBDI relay is located,
where k 2 {1, ..., N}. The three-phase rms voltage and current measured at this
bus is Vk and Ik. Distance relays can operate on both line-to-ground or line-to-line
impedances. In this study, only line-to-ground impedance is considered for simplicity
and is calculated as
ZLG =
Vphase
Iphase + kI0
(2.1)
where zero-sequence current I0 =
1
3(Ia + Ib + Ic) and k =
Z0 Z1
Z0
for zero-sequence
and positive-sequence impedances, Z0 and Z1 respectively. When the MBDI relay
identifies the apparent impedance entering Zone 3, the relay will start timing based
on the specified time-delay setting. This part of the algorithm is the same as conven-
tional methods, shown in the bottom left portion of Fig. 2.2a. However, potential
fault scenarios are simulated using the MBDI circuit model in parallel, shown on
the bottom right portion of Fig. 2.2a and Fig. 2.2b. Because Zone 3 is designed to
operate for faults on the adjacent lines where primary protection has failed, MBDI
first simulates faults on the adjacent line as the most likely candidate using the
measured in impedance data. Note that this framework prioritizes simulation of
relay or circuit breaker mis-operation scenarios to supervise Zone 3 operation.
The output of the MBDI simulations returns several parameters, however, for
this study it is shown that the expected rms voltages at each Bus k, where Vˆk =h
Vˆak Vˆbk Vˆck
i
, are su cient to supervise Zone 3 operation. The MBDI framework
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Measure Vk and Ik
ZLG,k < Z3set
No
Yes
Start zone 3 timer MBDI simulations
Z1,k < Z3set
t > t3set
Yes No
No
Calculate ε 
θ = 1
Yes
 ε < εth
No
Trip Yes θ = 1
No Start timer
t > tmatch
Yes
No
(a)
MBDI Simulations
Return |Vk|
Initialize model with 
measured Vk
Apply fault at 
possible locations
^
(b)
Figure 2.2: Overall flowchart of the MBDI algorithm shown in (a) and simulation
subroutine in (b).
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and even conventional relay setting methodologies assume the system model is a
good representation of the actual system. Therefore, if ZLG is observed within the
Zone 3 setting, MBDI simulations of possible faults on the adjacent line should
produce a match with measured bus voltages at nearby buses, Vk = [Vak Vbk Vck ],
within a reasonable tolerance. The di↵erence between the measured and expected
voltages is calculated as
✏ =
   |Vk|  |Vˆk|    (2.2)
where ✏ is the absolute error. The threshold or tolerance for absolute error is ✏th
and is set to 0.05pu voltage. The duration for ✏ to be below the threshold is tmatch
and is set to 1 cycle. If these conditions are met, the flag ✓ is set to 1. If the
bus voltages do not match or converge then ✓ = 0 and this is an indication that
observed impedance may not be a result of a fault and is possibly due to wide area
stressed disturbance. Therefore, it may be wise to not trip and risk propagating the
disturbance. The relay will wait momentarily until gets clearance from the MBDI
module. An upper limit for the time delay associated with the MBDI module may
be set such that the conventional Zone 3 logic can still operate.
2.2 Case Studies in a Small Transmission Network
2.2.1 Test System
To demonstrate the proposed scheme, a test system is developed in PSCAD/EMTDC
to simulate various scenarios. The test system is chosen to allow for variety of
faults and stressed condition simulations while being su ciently simple. A proof-of-
concept of the MBDI framework is achieved by running two models simultaneously
in PSCAD while communicating with each other. The first model represents the
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physical power system in which the MBDI relay operates. The second model repre-
sents the MBDI circuit model simulation and logic. The 5-bus test system is shown
in Fig. 2.3 and consists of two generation buses (Bus 1 and Bus 3) and two load
buses (Bus 2 and Bus 3). The two transformers in the system step up generation
voltage from 15 kV to 345 kV for transmission. System parameters are from [41].
Bus 5
Bus 2
Bus 4
400 MVA
15 kV
400 MVA
15/345 
kV
T1 T2
Bus 1 Bus 3
800 MVA
345/15 
kV
800 MVA
15 kV
Line 3
Line 2 Line 1
B51 50 mi
200 mi100 mi
B42
Figure 2.3: Single-line diagram of test system and validation fault scenarios.
The following assumptions are made for the MBDI algorithm above. The system
structure, e.g., line configurations and impedances are considered to be fixed. Bus
voltages and loads are considered variable and updated in real-time. Furthermore, it
is assumed that the simulation model can determine fault location with reasonable
accuracy. In this proof-of-concept, possible fault locations are determined by the
apparent impedance phasor magnitude and phase angle. An intentional time delay
of 3/5 cycles is added in order to model the expected delay due to the communication
between adjacent buses; additional time delays are not intentionally added into the
model.
2.2.2 Fault Scenarios
The test system demonstrates how an MBDI relay operates for actual faults. Only
three-phase faults are applied because stressed system conditions are considered to
a↵ect three-phases simultaneously. In these scenarios, the relay is located at breaker
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B51, shown in Fig. 2.3. Four fault scenarios, each a three phase-to-ground fault
with negligible fault resistance, are simulated at di↵erent locations along Line 3
(5%, 50%, and 95% from Bus 5) and on Line 1 (10% from Bus 4). The locations are
chosen to test operation of the MBDI framework for close-in faults, mid-line faults,
faults just outside of the Zone 1 reach, and Zone 3 faults.
The validation results show that the MBDI framework correctly issues a confir-
mation signal for faults inside protected zones. The results for the Zone 3 fault are
shown in Fig. 2.4 and 2.5. These, however, are also representative of the other fault
scenarios. In Fig. 2.4a it is shown that the measured impedance enters into the
Zone 3 characteristic. The MBDI relay at B51 senses the fault in Zone 3 and begins
timing while simultaneously initiating the MBDI simulations shown in Fig. 2.4b.
Using the measured impedance magnitude and phase angle, faults are simulated at
possible locations on Line 1. In this case, because the apparent impedance magni-
tude is in Zone 3 with a phase angle along the transmission line, the simulated fault
is applied on Line 1, between Bus 4 and Bus 2.
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Figure 2.4: Apparent impedance comparison for Zone 3 fault scenario. MBDI sim-
ulation in (b) closely matches Zone 3 fault impedance in (a).
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Figure 2.5a shows ✏ for nearby buses 2, 4, and 5 as the simulation runs. It
can be seen that the bus voltages converge below the threshold for longer than the
required duration of 1 cycle as the MBDI simulation has provided a matching fault
scenario. In Fig. 2.5b, Zone 3 detects a fault and picks up at approximately t =
0.22s. The MBDI simulations run in parallel and determine the correct location for
the perceived fault and begins the fault simulation at approximately t = 0.23s. As
the simulation progresses, the bus voltages from the simulated fault condition and
measured bus voltages begin to converge. At t = 0.34s, ✏ falls below the threshold
value of 0.05 pu for longer than 1 cycle and confirms the fault condition. The MBDI
module completes its assessment 130ms after Zone 3 picks up, well before a typical
Zone 3 delay of 300ms.
In each of the three fault scenarios, the MBDI module is able to accurately
supervise the relay’s trip decision. In all cases, the di↵erences between the measured
and simulated bus voltages at Bus 2, Bus 4, and Bus 5 converge below the preset
tolerance of 0.05 pu for at least 1 cycle. An important observation from the sequence
of trip signals from each fault scenario is that additional time is required between
the initial mho relay pickup and the MBDI module issuing a confirmation signal.
The longest total duration between initial pickup and confirmation is approximately
0.23s for a mid-line fault and the shortest is 0.10s for a close-in fault. The total time
duration before the supervisory layer issues the confirmation signal can be broken
down into several components listed below:
• Communication time of measured values from k remote buses
• Simulation time of the circuit model
• Time to convergence between measured and simulated values below threshold
• Duration of time that convergence is maintained below threshold
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Figure 2.5: Zone 3 fault scenario: (a) Absolute error between measured and simu-
lated bus voltages magnitudes and (b) and sequence of signals.
• Computation time in the MBDI logic
The PSCAD/EMTDC model inserts an intentional time delay in order to model
the expected delay due to the communication between the relay and k adjacent
buses. This is simulated in the PSCAD model as a 3/5 cycle delay between the
power system model and MBDI simulation. The time delay components for circuit
model simulation, convergence between measured and simulated values, and super-
visory logic computation are captured as part of the PSCAD model implementation;
additional time delays are not added into the model for these components. Lastly,
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measured and simulated values must maintain convergence below the threshold for
1 cycle. This value is unchanged for all scenarios. Furthermore, the time durations
discussed above are measured inside the PSCAD simulation. When this scheme is
implemented in hardware, the time durations will also be dependent on the hard-
ware components. In the next section, the proposed scheme will be evaluated for
stressed system conditions. In those scenarios, the expected response of the supervi-
sory layer will be to determine that a fault does not exist on the system and prevent
incorrect relay trip. Di↵erences between measured and simulated bus voltages are
not expected to converge.
2.2.3 Case Studies for Stressed System Scenarios
In this section, the operation of the MBDI framework is demonstrated for stressed
system conditions where conventional relays may mis-operate. Three scenarios are
tested: load encroachment, voltage excursion, and high resistance fault. For each
scenario, the goal is to first demonstrate how these conditions can cause a conven-
tional relay to improperly trip. Then, the same scenario will be conducted with the
relay equipped with the proposed supervisory scheme. It will be shown that a relay
operating under the MBDI framework can e↵ectively utilize simulation circuit mod-
els to supervise the relay’s trip decision and provide secure operation. The section
concludes with a summary of the results and a discussion of potential future work
to further develop this concept.
Load Encroachment
Load encroachment has been often cited as a cause for several relay mis-operations.
In general, apparent impedance at the local bus is reduced to within the operating
characteristic, typically Zone 3, due to heavy loading on remote lines. In this case
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study, the relay location is chosen at breaker B42 shown in Fig. 2.3. The zone
reach settings for the relay at B42 are set at 85%, 120%, and 210% for Zone 1,
Zone 2, and Zone 3, respectively. Load encroachment as observed by the relay at
breaker B42 is simulated by incrementally increasing the load level at Bus 2. As
a result, the voltage at Bus 2 decreases slowly to 0.636 pu and at Bus 4 to 0.959
pu. The depressed voltage at Bus 2 due to load encroachment is comparable to
those reported in [5]. As the load draws more real power over Line 1, the apparent
impedance seen at Bus 4 declines and begins to approach the Zone 3 characteristic.
Note that because the load is more resistive than reactive, the apparent impedance
approaches the Zone 3 characteristic with a smaller phaser angle than in the voltage
excursion scenario. Load encroachment is also a long-term deviation, and again the
apparent impedance enters the Zone 3 characteristic for longer than the set time
delay (typically 1s or greater). A fault does not actually exist on the system, but
the heavy loading on the line and reduced voltage will cause a conventional relay to
trip, as shown in Fig. 2.6a.
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Figure 2.6: Apparent impedance comparison for load encroachment scenario, with
load encroachment impedance in (a) and MBDI fault simulation in (b).
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The scenario is then run again with the same load encroachment condition ap-
plied at Bus 2. However, the MBDI scheme is now enabled. The overall results
are shown in Figs. 2.6 and 2.7. Heavy loading on the line results in the apparent
impedance entering the Zone 3 characteristic of relay distance element Fig. 2.6a and
initiates the MBDI module. Impedance magnitude and phase information is used
to determine possible fault locations in the simulation model. The closest match
resulting from MBDI simulations is shown in Fig. 2.6b. The reactive component
of the measured impedance estimates approximately the distance of the fault away
from the relay and the resistive component estimates the fault resistance. In this
case, the closest match occurs at a perceived fault location of 95% of Line 1, with a
maximum resistance of 100 ohms. Note that an upper bound of 100 ohms provides
a reasonable limit for simulated fault scenarios on a 345kV line.
Figure 2.7a shows ✏ for nearby buses 2, 4, and 5 as the simulation runs. It can
be seen that, the bus voltages do not converge because the root causes of the low
apparent impedances are not the same. In Fig. 2.7b, initially Zone 3 detects a fault
and issues the initiation signal for MBDI simulations to run in parallel. The MBDI
module determines the location for a perceived fault and begins the fault simulation
at time 0.11s. As the simulation runs, the bus voltages from the simulated fault
condition do not converge to the measured bus voltages because the root causes are
di↵erent. As long as the load encroachment condition exists, the MBDI module will
attempt to simulate possible faults that produce similar bus voltages. Consequently,
a confirmatory signal is not issued. In this case, the relay operating under the MBDI
framework e↵ectively blocks an incorrect relay trip for a load encroachment at the
remote bus. Tripping breaker B42 and opening Line 1 would have propagated the
disturbance. However, by preventing an incorrect trip of Line 1, other relays or
the operator can appropriately respond to the load encroachment and allow system
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conditions to be restored.
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Figure 2.7: Load Encroachment scenario: (a) Absolute error between measured and
simulated bus voltages magnitudes (b) and sequence of signals.
Voltage Excursion
In this case study, a voltage excursion at remote Bus 4 is simulated. Voltage excur-
sions consist of long-term and short-term variations from nominal system voltage
and can be a precursor to more serious issues such as voltage instability and voltage
collapse. Voltage excursions generally occur at a bus when there is lack of su cient
reactive power support to match the load reactive power demand. Under high load-
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ing conditions, a disturbance such as tripping of a line or generator can lead to a
voltage excursion at a weak bus [23]. In this scenario, the zone reach settings for
the relay at B51 are set at 85%, 120%, and 210% for Zone 1, Zone 2, and Zone
3, respectively. Note that because the length of the primary line (Line 3) is much
smaller than the remote line (Line 1), the Zone 3 setting is conservatively chosen to
only cover a portion of Line 1. In this way, the results from the simulated voltage
excursion can also apply to situations where the remote line is a shorter length.
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Figure 2.8: Apparent impedance comparison for voltage excursion scenario, with
measured impedance in (a) and MBDI fault simulation in (b).
A voltage excursion is simulated at remote Bus 4 by slowly reducing the out-
put from the upstream generator at Bus 3. This simulates a disturbance and lack
of reactive power support a Bus 4, causing voltage at Bus 4 to slowly decline to
0.475 pu. As a result, the voltage at local Bus 5 slightly declines to 0.934 pu. This
voltage excursion at Bus 4 results in reduced apparent impedance at the relay at
Bus 5. Because the voltage excursion occurs as a long-term deviation, the apparent
impedance enters the Zone 3 characteristic for longer than the set time delay (typi-
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cally 1s or greater). Even though a fault does not actually exist on the system, the
reduced apparent impedance causes the relay to trip. From the impedance plots in
Fig. 2.8, it can be seen that the apparent impedance at the relay slowly approaches
and ultimately enters the Zone 3 characteristic. The relay at B51 will identify the
low impedance as a fault and incorrectly issues a trip signal to open the breaker.
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Figure 2.9: Absolute error between measured and simulated bus voltages magnitudes
(a) and sequence of trip signals (b). The relay does not trip under voltage excursion
because measured and simulated voltages do not converge.
The same voltage excursion is then applied at Bus 4 with the MBDI scheme
enabled and the results are shown in Figs. 2.8 and 2.9. Similar to the previous sce-
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nario, the reactive component of the measured impedance estimates approximately
the distance of the fault away from the relay and the resistive component estimates
the fault resistance. In this case, the MBDI module determines the perceived fault
location to be on Line 1, between Bus 4 and Bus 2, and applies faults at possible
locations. The plot in Fig. 2.8b shows the three-phase apparent impedance of the
simulated fault with the closest match. The calculated ✏ for nearby buses 2, 4, and 5
is shown in Fig. 2.9 as the simulation runs. As the simulation runs, the bus voltages
from the simulated fault condition do not converge to the measured bus voltages
because the root causes are di↵erent. Therefore, the MBDI module does not issue
a confirmatory signal e↵ectively blocks an incorrect relay trip at B51 for a voltage
excursion at the remote Bus 4.
High Resistance Fault
In the prior case study, the power system experienced a load encroachment condition
causing apparent impedance at the relay to enter the Zone 3 characteristic. The
MBDI module, however, correctly detected that it was not a fault condition and
blocked an incorrect trip. In practice, distance relays may be equipped with a load
encroachment blocking feature, as discussed in Section 1.1. This feature e↵ectively
blocks a region of the impedance plane around the R-axis and prevents tripping
in this region. However, a tradeo↵ with enabling the feature is that faults whose
impedance falls in the load encroachment blocking region will not be detected by
the relay. In this case study, it is first shown that a relay with traditional mho logic
and load encroachment blocking may not detect faults with high fault resistance
and then show how a relay operating with the proposed scheme can enable relays
utilizing load encroachment blocking to detect high resistance faults. A single-line
diagram illustrating the fault scenario of this case study is shown in Fig. 2.10.
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Figure 2.10: Single-line diagram of for high resistance fault scenario.
The relay for this scenario is located at circuit breaker B42 is a conventional
distance relay that utilizes load encroachment blocking–with zone settings at 85%,
120%, and 210% for Zones 1, 2, and 3, repsectively. A high resistance fault of 80 ⌦
is simulated on Line 1 at approximately 20% of the line impedance away from the
relay. The impedance trajectories for each phase, in Fig. 2.11a, are shown entering
the Zone 3 characteristic. However, because the impedances are within the load
encroachment blocking region, the relay will not trip for such a fault. This scenario
demonstrates one tradeo↵ when utilizing load encroachment blocking. With this
feature enabled, the relay is less susceptible to tripping due to load, however, it is
unable to detect faults within the blocking region.
In previous case studies, the output from the MBDI module was used to dis-
criminate stressed system conditions from a fault condition. In this case study, the
true system state is a fault with impedance inside the load encroachment blocking
region. The same high resistance fault scenario is run again with MBDI module
enabled and results shown in Figs. 2.11 and 2.12. The MBDI algorithm is modified
to validate impedances falling within both the load encroachment blocking region
and any of the zone characteristics. Therefore, as soon as impedances enter any zone
characteristic, the MBDI module determines possible fault locations and applies a
high resistance fault in Line 1.
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Figure 2.11: Apparent impedance comparison for high resistance fault scenario, with
measured impedance in (a) and MBDI fault simulation in (b). Load encroachment
blocking region is shown in (a).
Figure 2.12 shows the di↵erences between measured and simulated bus voltages
at Bus 2, Bus 4, and Bus 5. It can be seen that the high impedance fault occurs at
t = 0.23 s and the relay detects an impedance within both the load encroachment
blocking region and one of the zone characteristics. Immediately the bus voltage
di↵erences increase and can be seen in Fig. 2.12a between 0.23 and 0.25s. The
MBDI module determines the correct location for the perceived fault and begins
the fault simulation at approximately 0.25s. However, as the simulation runs, the
measured and simulated bus voltages begin to converge. At time t = 0.27s, the bus
voltage di↵erences converge below the threshold value of 0.05 pu for longer than
1 cycle. The MBDI module determines the root causes between the measure and
simulated system are the same and issues a confirmatory signal indicating a fault
condition . This results in the load encroachment blocking being released and the
relay is allowed to trip at t = 0.27s. In this case, the relay equipped with MBDI
scheme e↵ectively discriminates between load encroachment and a high resistance
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fault, even though load encroachment blocking is enabled.
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Figure 2.12: Absolute error between measured and simulated bus voltages magni-
tudes (a) and sequence of signals (b).
2.2.4 Conclusion from Case Studies
In each of the three case studies, the proposed MBDI scheme is able to supervise the
relay’s trip decision. For the voltage excursion and load encroachment scenario, the
MBDI correctly prevents the relay from tripping when a fault is not present in the
system. In these scenarios, security of the relay has been improved under stressed
system conditions. In the high resistance fault scenario, MBDI is able detect a
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fault inside the load encroachment blocking region. For this case study, the MBDI
helps mitigate a tradeo↵ with the load encroachment blocking feature. It should
also be noted that the MBDI framework does not rely on relay settings in the way
traditional relays do. Therefore, it can prevent unwanted tripping in cases where the
settings are incorrect. For example, a relay engineer can mistakenly set Zone 3 reach
larger than intended. In a traditional relay, this incorrect setting extends the Zone
3 reach, making the relay more susceptible to load encroachment. However, with
the MBDI framework, even with an incorrect Zone 3 setting, the logic would block
relay operation because a fault is not present in the system. This inherent feature
to the design of the scheme, further increases security under stressed conditions.
The result of testing the proposed supervisory scheme under various scenarios
indicates that incorporating simulation circuit models in relays can improve security
of remote backup protection under stressed system conditions. However, challenges
and areas of future work remain which can further develop and improve the initial
concept. These topics are presented in Section 4.
2.3 Summary
The MBDI framework is introduced to supervise and enhance security of remote
backup protection and discriminate between 3-phase faults and stressed conditions.
In true fault scenarios, the use of simulation circuit model output at the relay level
is shown to accurately confirm the relay’s trip decision well before the Zone 3 time
delay expires. It is then shown for a load encroachment scenario that the proposed
scheme correctly prevents the relay from tripping when a fault is not present in the
system – thus improving the security.
Another important consideration is the time required for MBDI complete its
assessment. In particular, for true fault scenarios, the MBDI output should confirm
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a Zone 3 fault before the Zone 3 timer expires. It is shown that confirmation of the
fault is provided within 100ms. Practical implementation of this scheme will also be
dependent on the hardware components. The total time duration required can be
broken down into several components such as, communication from remote buses,
simulation time of the circuit model, time to convergence of the error ✏ below the
threshold, and duration that convergence is maintained below the threshold. The
results presented herein, however, demonstrate the potential viability of the MBDI
framework and provide a basis for future development.
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Chapter 3
Supervision of Power Swing
Blocking Using MBDI
In chapter, an application of the MBDI framework is investigated, which was intro-
duced in Chapter 2, applied to power swing blocking. It has been shown to supervise
relay decisions and prevent undesired operation of remote backup elements during
load encroachment and other slowly developing stressed system conditions. The
power swing phenomenon can be characterized by oscillations in power flow be-
tween two areas of a power system due to an abrupt imbalance in mechanical and
electrical power [42]. Initiating events that can result in a power swing include
short-circuit faults, line switching, and large changes in generation or load – creat-
ing sudden di↵erences in electrical power while mechanical power remains constant.
The resulting oscillations in generator rotor angles can create extreme oscillations
in power flows. Depending on the control system response, this phenomenon can
lead to the eventual loss of synchronism between groups of generators.
Initiation of cascading outages are often characterized by stressed system condi-
tions, including large power oscillations. Therefore, it is critical that relays operate
securely under such conditions. During a power swing, load impedance can enter
into Zone 1 or Zone 2 of a distance relay, appearing as a 3-phase fault and causing
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an unintentional line trip. Although modern distance relays can provide a function
for power swing blocking (PSB), the feature operates based on impedance rate of
change and may fail to block if the impedance moves too fast during the swing [43].
The objective in this chapter is to investigate the e cacy of a relay equipped with
MBDI to block tripping during power swings, presenting advantages and disadvan-
tages of such a scheme. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 details the
power swing phenomenon, discussing current practices to block relay operation and
possible areas of improvement. Section 2.1 briefly describes the MBDI framework
and how it is modified for power swing blocking. Section 3.2 presents case studies
of power swing conditions in a 5-bus system and a discussion of results.
3.1 Conventional Impedance-based PSB Schemes
3.1.1 Impedance Measured by Distance Relay During Power Swings
and Out-of-step Conditions
The analysis of the e↵ect of power swings and out-of-step conditions on distance
protection is discussed in [44]. During system disturbances, generators in a large
interconnected power system form coherent groups of machines swinging with re-
spect to each other. Under such conditions, a distance relay installed in the tie-line
connecting the areas of two coherent groups of machines may observe impedance
during the power swing as a three-phase fault when the positive sequence impedance
trajectory enters its operating characteristic. In the following discussion, we provide
an analysis for this phenomenon using a simple two-machine system.
Consider Fig. 3.1, where a distance relay A is installed at Bus A in the tie-line
of a two-area system represented by two machines. The voltage and current seen by
the relay at Bus A can be expressed as shown in (3.1) and (3.2), respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Tie-line connected between two areas. Distance relay A is installed at
Bus A.
VA = Vs\    ZSIL (3.1)
IL =
VS\    VR
Zs + ZL + ZR
=
VS\    VR
ZT
(3.2)
The positive sequence impedance seen by the relay is
Z1 =
VA
IL
=  ZS + ZT VS\ 
VS\    VR (3.3)
Assuming the case when |VS | = |VR| [23], the impedance trajectory as   is varied
and given by (3.4).
Z1 =
✓
ZT
2
  ZS
◆
  j
✓
ZT
2
cot
 
2
◆
(3.4)
During the out-of-step (OOS) condition, when the generator voltages are 180 
apart, the voltage at the middle of the line becomes zero. In other words, the
distance relay perceives a three-phase fault at the middle of the line. In the case
of a stable power swing, depending on the swing magnitude, the impedance locus
may enter relay A’s operating characteristic Zone 1, Zone 2, or Zone 3. The Zone
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Figure 3.2: Trajectory of power swing in complex impedance plane and PSB scheme.
1 distance relay element, which typically has no intentional time delay, and backup
protection elements may operate during both stable or unstable power swings [45].
3.1.2 Impedance-based PSB Schemes
The conventional power swing blocking (PSB) impedance-based methods rely on
the principle that the oscillations are relatively slow during power swings due to
system inertias. Subsequently, the apparent impedance seen by the relay moves in
the complex plane with a slow trajectory compared to that during faults, where
the apparent impedance switches to the fault location almost instantaneously. To
measure the rate of change of impedance, these methods use two impedance mea-
suring elements called blinders, shown in Fig. 3.2. A timer is started when the
apparent positive-sequence impedance enters the outer blinder. If the impedance
remains between the two blinders for a pre-determined time delay, a power swing
is detected and selected distance zone elements are blocked for certain time period.
While some relays use a single blinder, others can use double-blinders. Furthermore,
the blinders can have quadrilateral, o↵set mho, or lenticular shapes [46].
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3.1.3 Issues with Traditional Impedance-based PSB Methods
Although there are many power system quantities that can be measured, such as rate
of change of power, phase angle di↵erence across a transmission line, swing-center
voltage, etc., most traditional power swing detection methods use rate of change of
apparent positive sequence impedance. There are many issues associated with this
method. One of the issues is the di culty in the placement of the inner and outer
blinders. The inner blinder must be placed outside the largest distance protection
characteristic to ensure there is enough time to carry out blocking of the selected
distance elements when the power swing is detected. The outer blinder must be
placed away from the load region to prevent misoperation of power swing blocking
because of load encroachment. This setting is di cult to accomplish especially in
case of long lines with heavy loading where the line impedance is large compared to
system impedances [23, 42].
Another issue is setting the impedance separation between the two blinder el-
ements and the timer setting for e↵ective di↵erentiation between a power swing
and a fault. As the rate of change of impedance is a function of system inertias
and the accelerating torques, the blinder separation and timer delay settings need
to be carefully chosen after performing system stability studies considering all pos-
sible operating conditions [23, 42, 44]. Furthermore, during out-of-step conditions,
the slip frequency increases after the first slip cycle to subsequent cycles. As such,
fixed impedance separation and fixed time delay settings may result in misoper-
ation of power swing detection due to a faster rate of change of impedance after
certain slip subcycles. These complexities illustrate the vulnerabilities in conven-
tional impedance-based methods.
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3.2 Case Studies
To demonstrate operation of conventional PSB schemes with MBDI logic, a test
system is developed in PSCAD/EMTDC to simulate various scenarios. The test
system is chosen to allow for variety of faults and power swing scenarios while
being su ciently simple. The MBDI framework is implemented by running two
models simultaneously in PSCAD with communication between each other. The first
model represents the physical power system in which the distance relay operates.
The second model represents the MBDI circuit model simulation and logic. A
single-line diagram of the 5-bus test system is shown in Fig. 2.3 and consists of
two generation buses (Bus 1 and Bus 3) and two load buses (Bus 2 and Bus 3).
The two transformers in the system step up generation voltage from 15 kV to 345
kV for transmission. System parameters and distance relay settings are modified
from [41] and [32], respectively. The following scenarios demonstrate operation of
a conventional PSB scheme in conjunction with the MBDI supervisory logic. The
power swing is simulated by creating a mechanical torque input disturbance to the
800 MVA generator. For all scenarios, the relay is located at circuit breaker B51.
3.2.1 Scenario 1: Conventional Operation of PSB and MBDI
Slow Power Swing
Consider a slow power swing where the apparent impedance at the relay crosses
through the blinders of the PSB scheme. The swing frequency is less than 2 Hz
as observed in Fig. 3.3a and results in the PSB scheme to block operation of all
distance elements for 2 s. As shown in Fig. 3.3c, the PSB signal goes high at 0.64 s
and blocks operation of the distance elements correctly. Furthermore, the MBDI
logic begins simulating possible faults as the apparent impedance enters Zone 3.
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However, as shown in Fig. 3.3b, the adjacent bus voltages for simulated faults
do not converge to the measured bus voltages within the specified threshold. The
MBDI logic, therefore, also confirms that the observed impedance variation is not
due to a fault condition.
Fault Scenario
Consider a Zone 2 fault at 90% of Line 3. Due to the fast change in apparent
impedance, the PSB scheme does not detect a power swing and allows distance
elements to trip. In parallel, the MBDI logic begins simulating possible faults after
the impedance enters Zone 2 at 2.010s. The simulated and measured system bus
voltages converge within 40 ms, and the MBDI logic confirms a Zone 2 fault before
the timer expires and the Zone 2 distance element trips the breaker as intended.
This scenario is shown in Fig. 3.4 and demonstrates that MBDI logic can correctly
supervise true fault scenarios for backup distance elements, such as Zone 2 and Zone
3.
3.2.2 Scenario 2: Fast Power Swing
Conventional PSB schemes can fail if the observed power swing frequency is faster
than anticipated. Choosing the appropriate timer setting can often be di cult due to
challenges in modeling system inertias over several operating conditions. A typical
upper bound for power swing frequency that is considered for PSB setting is 4-7
Hz [42]. In Scenario 2, a fast power swing occurs with a frequency of approximately
5 Hz, which is in this maximum range. If the PSB scheme is not set to detect this
swing speed, the apparent impedance trajectory will appear as a fault, allowing the
distance elements to operate. The PSB double blinder scheme is shown in Fig. 3.5
and it can be seen that the impedance trajectory enters Zones 2 and 3 during the
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Figure 3.3: Scenario 1: Slow power swing where PSB correctly issues blocking signal
and MBDI correctly does not issue trip.
swing. In Fig. 3.6c, it is observed that the PSB scheme does not detect the swing
and the Zone 3 element is allowed to pick up.
The instantaneous voltage observed at the relay is shown in Fig. 3.6a and the
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Figure 3.4: Scenario 1: Zone 2 fault where PSB does not block and MBDI correctly
confirms a fault.
trip signals are shown in Fig. 3.6c. The PSB scheme does not issue a blocking signal
for the power swing. The MBDI logic begins simulating possible Zone 3 faults at
1.12 s into the simulation. However, as shown in in Fig. 3.6b, the system bus
voltages from the MBDI fault simulations do not converge with those measured and
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Figure 3.5: Scenario 2: Impedance trajectory of fast swing, moving left to right,
showing impedance crossing Zones 2 and 3.
the MBDI logic does not issue a confirmatory trip signal. In this scenario, although
the PSB scheme is unable to detect the power swing, the MBDI logic is able to block
the distance elements and prevent a misoperation.
3.2.3 Scenario 3: Slow Power Swing and Three-Phase Fault
Another drawback of conventional PSB blinder schemes is that once a power swing
is detected, the distance elements are blocked. If a three-phase fault occurs during
this blocking interval, the response of the distance elements will be delayed. In
Scenario 3, consider a slow power swing causing the PSB scheme to block distance
elements from operating for a set time, similar to the slow power swing of Scenario
1. The apparent impedance observed by the relay is shown in Fig. 3.7. Initially, the
impedance slowly crosses the double blinders and the distance elements are blocked
from operating at 0.39 s when the PSB signal is issued, shown in Fig. 3.8c. While
the blocking signal is active, a three-phase fault occurs in Zone 3 at 0.50 s. In this
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Figure 3.6: Scenario 2: PSB does not detect the swing due to fast slip frequency.
MBDI logic does not confirm fault in Zone 3 and Zone 3 is blocked.
scenario, MBDI is able to confirm a fault condition while the PSB signal is active,
allowing the fault to be cleared faster.
Under a conventional PSB scheme, the fault will exist in the system for at least
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Figure 3.7: Scenario 3: Impedance trajectory shows fault in Zone 3 after PSB has
issued blocking signal.
the duration of the PSB reset time if remote backup protection is required. However,
the MBDI logic can supervise the PSB signal and confirm a fault condition. At
0.54 s, MBDI logic simulates possible Zone 3 faults and compares the simulated
system bus voltages with those measured from adjacent buses. As observed in Fig.
3.8b, the bus voltage magnitudes converge to within the allowed tolerance and the
MBDI logic issues a trip signal.
3.3 Summary
In this work, the MBDI framework is applied to supervise power swing blocking
schemes in distance relays. The framework uses the output of circuit model simula-
tions within the relay to accurately supervise conventional PSB schemes and prevent
misoperations. In Scenario 1, it is shown that the MBDI logic supports conventional
PSB operation and does not interfere with its blocking signal. In Scenarios 2 and
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Figure 3.8: Scenario 3: A Slow swing is followed by a three-phase fault in Zone 3.
PSB is blocking all zones, however, MBDI simulations confirm a Zone 3 fault.
3, MBDI logic is shown to supervise and provide the correct blocking or trip signal
where conventional PSB schemes may fail. The results demonstrate the potential
of the MBDI framework for supervising distance relays for enhanced security.
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Chapter 4
Hardware Development and
Design
In this section, the development and implementation of the initial MBDI concept
is described. The performance of the proposed framework can be further evaluated
with existing methods based on specified criteria, including the following: complex-
ity, security, selectivity, dependability, cost of implementation, and maintainability.
Another important consideration is the time required for MBDI complete its as-
sessment. The nature of protective relaying necessitates that protection schemes be
able to quickly and accurately detect and isolate faults in a given protected zone.
Furthermore, coordination between relays relies heavily upon relay operating times.
Therefore, a prototype relay capable of implementing the proposed protection frame-
work is developed to demonstrate practical operation. The prototype relay will be
tested for fault conditions on a power system test bed, described at the end of this
section.
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4.1 Prototype Design and Component Selection Basis
Numerical relays are the standard today for protective relay design [47] and can
have a wide range of protection functions. However, the majority of relay functions,
e.g. di↵erential, over-current, and distance, operate based on local measurements
of voltage and current (or derived quantities) of the fundamental frequency [48]. A
block diagram illustrating major components for a typical numerical relay design is
shown below in Fig. 4.1.
Analog to 
Digital 
Converter 
(ADC)
Signal 
Processing
(DSP)
Analog Front-end
Power Supply
CT/
PT
AA 
filter
Inst. 
amp
CT/
PT
AA 
filter
Inst. 
amp
.  .  .  .  .
Conventional
Trip Logic
Breaker 
Trip
Figure 4.1: Typical numerical relay design.
The analog front end converts measured voltage and current to a di↵erential volt-
age signal, which is amplified and then passed through an anti-aliasing filter prior
to analog-to-digital conversion. Multiple channels may be required to measure dif-
ferent phases of voltage and current simultaneously. The analog-to-digital-converter
(ADC) should be able to handle multiple channels with high resolution, high speed,
and large input range. The output of the ADC is then passed to a processor chosen
to have characteristics suited for digital signal processing (DSP) applications, as
Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) calculation is required. The trip logic for the relay
is also implemented by the processor. The following summarizes key criteria when
choosing component specifications.
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Speed Requirements Typically, fault conditions must be cleared as quickly as
possible. Standards that govern relay response time include ANSI C37.90, IEC255-
4, IEC60255-3. This requires that the relay hardware responds as fast as possible
without sacrificing accuracy.
Accuracy Requirements The input signals (particularly current) have a large
dynamic range as fault currents can be several times that of the load current; the
relay is expected to operate accurately throughout this entire range. The analog
front end of the system must be properly designed for high resolution (recommended
minimum of 16-bit) [48] in order to achieve the following goals : high linearity, high
stability, and low noise. The preferred type of ADC, therefore, is the successive-
approximation register (SAR) which has characteristics of high linearity at high
sampling rates.
Simultaneous Sampling Requirements Many protection functions, distance
protection included, requires calculation of the phase angle between the measured
voltage and current. This allows further calculation of real power, reactive power,
power factor, impedance, and harmonics. The preferred way to synchronize the
instantaneous voltage and current measurements is to simultaneously sample both
signals, i.e., a simultaneous sampling ADC is required.
Controller Requirements In addition to performing FFT calculations for funda-
mental frequency components of voltage and current, the processor may be required
to calculate other quantities such as impedance, harmonics, and active power. These
calculated quantities can be used in the tripping logic of di↵erent protection algo-
rithms. The processor should also have the necessary timers available to implement
relay logic and connectivity to communicate with other devices. These requirements
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suggest a controller with high performance, comparable to a DSP, and multiple pe-
ripherals.
Based on the above selection criteria, Fig. 4.2 shows a block diagram of a possi-
ble implementation for an MBDI relay prototype. Additional blocks needed for the
MBDI framework are outlined in light blue. These include blocks for: circuit model
simulations, MBDI logic, and comparison real-time (RT) measurements. These
blocks will interact with conventional relay logic as described in Section 2.1 before
arriving at a breaker trip decision. The Raspberry Pi 2 microcontroller is initially
chosen to implement this part of the design. It is chosen for its performance charac-
teristics (900 MHz ARM-cortex A7 and 1GB RAM), available peripherals (including
40 GPIO pins) and low cost. The TI-ADS8556 is chosen to meet the performance
and simultaneous sampling requirements for the ADC.
Analog to 
Digital 
Converter 
(ADC)
Signal 
Processing
(DSP)
Analog Front-end
TI-ADS8556
Power Supply
CT/
PT
AA 
filter
Inst. 
amp
CT/
PT
AA 
filter
Inst. 
amp
.  .  .  .  .
Conventional
Trip Logic
Raspberry Pi 2
Circuit Model 
Simulations
MBDI 
Logic
Breaker 
Trip
RT 
Measurement 
Comparison
Figure 4.2: Block diagram of proposed MBDI relay design. Conventional relay
architecture is shown with black outline. Proposed modules to be integrated are
shown in light blue outline.
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4.2 Relay Input Signals and Processing
Operation of the distance relay is triggered based on apparent impedance at the relay
location. The relay only actually measures instantaneous voltage and current, but
estimates the phasor VLL\ z for line-to-line impedance by the following calculation.
Voltage and current are sampled at a specified multiple of the fundamental frequency
component, ns samples/cycle. Next the fast Fourier transform (FFT) is applied on
a 16-sample window. The FFT outputs the magnitude and phase angle of the
fundamental frequency phasor (60 Hz). The rms phasors of voltage and current are
used to calculate the line-to-line impedance phasor Z¯ab as follows:
Z¯ab =
V¯a   V¯b
I¯a   I¯b =
V¯a
I¯a
(4.1)
where (V¯a, I¯a) and (V¯b, I¯b) are the rms phasors of phase A and B voltage and current.
4.2.1 Analog-to-Digital Conversion
This section describes the simultaneous sampling of voltage and current needed by
the relay. At most, 6 channels will be required: three voltage and three current
measurements. Analog-to-Digital conversion is accomplished with the TI ADS1256.
In order to meet potential future requirements to observe high frequency compo-
nents, the sampling frequency is chosen at fs = 10.240 kHz or 170.66 samples/cycle.
The Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) is used for communication between the ADC
and microcontroller. The protocol is also known as the synchronous serial interface
(SSI), and utilizes a common clock signal to synchronize transmission between two
devices. One device acts as the master and the remaining devices as the slaves, with
the master device generating the clock signal. Four wires are utilized for communi-
cation: Sck (serial clock), MOSI (master out slave in), MISO (master in slave out),
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and SS (slave select, usually active low).
4.3 Distributed Power Flow Solver
The power flow solver used in this implementation is based the solver utilized in
OpenDSS. As discussed in the previous section, the system size is expected to be
no larger than the adjacent zone 3 buses, with Thevenin equivalent circuits ap-
proximating the system past these buses. For this reason, the fixed-point iteration
method for solving a system of equations utilized by OpenDSS and described in [49]
is implemented in the Raspberry Pi. An overview of the power flow algorithm is
briefly described below. The power flow for a given network is computed by solving
the system of equations Iinj = Y V or,
266664Iinj
377775 =
266664 Y
377775
266664V
377775 (4.2)
where Iinj is the node injection currents, Y is the n⇥n admittance matrix, and V is
the node voltages with respect to ground. The node injection current represents the
current injected into a node from outside the network represented by the admittance
matrix Y . For example, injection currents will be nonzero for nodes that include
current sources, voltage sources, nonlinear loads, or generator models. For a given
system state, the vector Iinj is known and admittance matrix Y is known. Therefore,
Eq. (4.2) is directly solved using the KLU sparse linear system solver [50]. The KLU
algorithm is implemented in the Raspberry Pi and is written in C with modifications
from [50] and [34].
The distributed solver implementation is tested by solving the power flow 1000
times for each particular test feeder, with results shown in Table 4.1 [34]. It can
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Table 4.1: Average solution times for selected test feeders
Test Feeder Avg. Solution Time [µs]
IEEE 13 node 136.3
IEEE 34 node 544.0
IEEE 37 node 508.9
IEEE 123 node 1049.3
IEEE 8500 node 37413.0
be observed that even for very large systems, e.g., IEEE 8500 node test feeder, the
implementation in the Raspberry Pi has average solution times less than 40 ms. For
systems representative of the size utilized by the MBDI algorithm, solution times
are less than 1 ms. The accuracy of the solution is demonstrated by comparing
the distributed implementation solution with the o↵-line OpenDSS solution for the
IEEE 37 node test feeder. There are a total of 117 nodes over all three system
phases and the total mean squared error over all nodes between the o↵-line and
distributed solution is 1.34⇥10 12. The overall results indicate that the distributed
power flow solution in the Raspberry Pi is capable of producing accurate power flow
results within the desired timing requirements.
4.4 Power System Test Bed
The MDBI relay prototype will be tested on a test bed representing a scaled model
of a 5-bus power system. The test bed incorporates a table-top three-phase power
system model, real-time monitoring and control system, and several locations to
apply faults. A schematic of the test bed is shown in Fig. 4.3 and photos of the
completed model are shown in Fig. 4.4. The power system model is built upon a 4 ft.
by 8 ft. platform, with transmission line parameters designed to be representative
of a 100-mi, 5-bus, 345kV system. The transmission lines are separated into 20-
mi nominal-pi circuit segments, consisting of inductors and capacitors. The model
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system includes both transmission and distribution circuits and operates at a scaled-
down 208V and 41.6V, respectively. The system is powered through step-up and
step-down transformers, supplying resistive load banks totaling 3kVA. The overall
scale of the model is over 500 lbs. and has over 2000 connection points. Additionally,
a real-time monitoring and control system, comprised of Arduino and the Raspberry
Pi microcontrollers, measures and displays voltage, current, and harmonic content
at each system bus. The model construction was completed as part of a senior
design project by Team WISE in Spring 2015. In addition, short-circuit faults are
safely applied through a specially designed enclosure shown in Fig. 4.5, allowing
application of multiple fault conditions. Fault current is limited by a power resistor
in series with fault connection.
Optional Source (1.5 kVA max):
x Wind Turbine 
x Wall Outlet
D.S.
D.S. 
(optional)
Primary Source (3 kVA max):
x Wall Outlet
D.S.
D.S. 
(optional)
Load Dump
(3ϕ)
40 mi 60 mi
SEL 421 SEL 421
SEL 421 SEL 421
D.S. 
(N/O)
R
R
D.S. 
(N/O)
3-1ϕ transformers
0.5 kVA (1ϕ)
208:24 V (1ϕ)
208:41.6 VLL (3ϕ)
Same as 
above
- 3ϕ tap
- Multiple 1ϕ loads
- 1.5 kVA total
- 3ϕ tap
- Multiple 1ϕ loads
- 1.5 kVA total
SEL 551
SEL 551
1 kVA max
A
V
kVA
V
SI
LL
load 32.82083
3
3
3
1max,  
 

 I A
V
kVA
V
SI
LL
load 8.206.413
5.1
3
3
2max,  
 

 I
Fault current magnitude will be controlled by fault impedance.
Maximum Load and Fault Current Calculation
Notes
SEL 421
SEL 551
SEL 421 requires voltage and current inputs.
SEL 551c requires current input only.
Symbol indicates faults can be simulated on line 
section.
Six 3ϕ solid state switches (25 A rating) are 
available.  Contactors (40A rating) will be used 
for the remaining breaker locations. 
3-1ϕ transformers
1 kVA (1ϕ)
208:120 V (1ϕ)
208:208 VLL (3ϕ)
3-1ϕ transformers
0.5 kVA (1ϕ)
208:120 V (1ϕ)
208:208 VLL (3ϕ)
T1
T2
T3
T4
Figure 4.3: Schematic of power system test bed.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.4: Power system test bed developed at the University of Texas at Austin.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.5: Fault application enclosure for safely applying various fault conditions
to the experimental power grid.
4.5 Experimental Results
In this section, an application of the proposed embedded real-time simulator and
MBDI algorithm is described. The objective of the MBDI relaying framework is to
supervise and secure the operation of remote backup protection elements. It is first
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initiated when the apparent impedance of the relay enters distance elements Zones 2
or 3. In parallel with the conventional time-delay setting, the potential fault scenar-
ios are simulated in the relay using the embedded real-time simulator. Considering
a Zone2 fault for example, MBDI logic first simulates candidate faults using the
apparent impedance data at the relay location. The output of the embedded fault
simulation returns expected rms voltages at each bus for each candidate fault sce-
nario. By comparing the embedded simulator solution with the measured real-time
bus voltages at adjacent buses, the MBDI logic can confirm or reject whether a fault
condition is present.
A simple experimental-scale physical power system test-bed is utilized to demon-
strate the integrated MBDI/embedded real-time simulator prototype. A represen-
tative scenario is described below. The fault current on the transmission sections
are limited to 6.7A, with a nominal load current of 1.4 A. A single line-to-ground
fault is then applied at 100% of the representative 100 mi. transmission line section
(shown in Fig. 4.4), corresponding to a Zone 2 fault. The top waveform captured in
Fig. 4.7 shows the measured fault current scaled through a current transducer (CT)
and the bottom waveform shows the output of the MBDI logic confirming the fault
condition. The results show that after the fault is detected, the proposed embedded
real-time simulator is able to simulate candidate fault scenarios. The simulation
output for the adjacent bus voltage magnitudes match the corresponding measured
values, allowing the MBDI logic to correctly send a supervisory confirmation of the
Zone 2 fault. The results further demonstrate that the proposed embedded real-time
simulator can help facilitate implementation of advanced protection concepts, such
as MBDI, and other applications where distributed real-time simulation is required.
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Raspberry Pi 2
TI-ADS8556
Figure 4.6: Raspberry Pi 2 and TI ADC used to implement prototype.
Figure 4.7: Fault current and MBDI supervisory signal captured for a Zone 2 fault
at 100% line impedance.
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Chapter 5
Supervised Learning for
Symmetrical Fault Detection
During Power Swings
In Chapters 2 and 3, a framework was developed for supervising remote backup
relay operations using circuit model simulations. The approach is e↵ective in remote
backup zones, such as Zone 2 and Zone 3, because the time delays ranging from 50-
300 ms allow su cient time for the simulations and measured signals to converge.
However, for instantaneous zones operating without intentional delay, improving
security during power swings using another approach is investigated. During a
power swing, load impedance can enter into zone 1 or zone 2 of a distance relay,
appearing as a symmetrical fault and causing an unintentional line trip. Therefore,
distance relay operation during power swing conditions should be blocked in order
to prevent unnecessary line trips leading to the formation of unplanned islands and
the propagation of disturbances. Although there are many power system quantities
that can be monitored, such as rate of change of power, phase angle di↵erence across
a transmission line, swing-center voltage, etc., most modern distance relays provide
a function for power swing blocking (PSB) which operates based on rate of change
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of positive sequence impedance. However, this method may still fail to block if the
impedance moves too fast during the power swing [43]. This approach fundamentally
relies on the signal, rate of change of impedance, to discriminate symmetrical faults
from power swings, conditioned on impedance being close to protected line. While
it allows for great interpretability, e.g. it is straightforward to interpret a decision
threshold specifying swing speeds greater than 6 Hz are classified as faults, the
approach su↵ers from two key challenges: setting the appropriate threshold for rate
of change of impedance and the detection of symmetrical faults after PSB has been
activated.
During power swing conditions, the instantaneous voltage and current signals
typically exhibit distinct characteristics from symmetrical faults. As a result, several
approaches have been proposed to augment conventional PSB [51–53] using addi-
tional signals, such as high-frequency components or remote terminal measurements.
In particular, machine learning, data mining, and statistical pattern recognition ap-
proaches have gained attention due to their ability to accurately detect patterns
in high-dimensional data sets and ability to detect faults in scenarios where dis-
crimination is not straightforward. For example, [54–56] apply classification models
to detect high-impedance faults and faults on series compensated lines. Detection
of symmetrical faults during power swings using classification methods is shown
in [57–60] with good results. However, in these prior works, the primary focus has
been to achieve high classification rates with only a minor emphasis on investigating
the trade-o↵ between accuracy and interpretability.
Therefore, in this chapter an alternative machine learning based approach us-
ing an e↵ective feature selection criteria is proposed to augment discrimination of
symmetrical faults during power swings. The approach seeks to maintain the perfor-
mance of high-dimensional classifiers in the least amount of features and to provide
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intuitive understanding with visualization and evaluation methods. The following
classifiers are compared and evaluated: support vector machine, random forest,
gradient tree boosting, CART decision tree, and k-nearest neighbors. The con-
tribution of the approach is a systematic and interpretable approach resulting in
the training of classifiers that maintains high classification rates. The approach
is evaluated on power swing and fault scenario data from the IEEE 9-Bus system
in PSCAD/EMTDC, consisting of scenarios where power swings enter zone 1 and
where conventional relays are likely to fail. The results show excellent classification
and true-positive rates, while minimizing false-positives. Furthermore, the analy-
sis shows ensemble approaches using decision tree classifiers, such as random forest
and gradient tree boosting, have better performance than other classifiers presented
in literature. The approach further emphasizes analyzing the classifier’s predicted
probabilities and trade-o↵s between true-positive and false-positive rates instead of
relying solely on the binary decision, resulting in a more interpretable model with
similar or better performance.
5.1 Proposed Classification Approach
5.1.1 Generating Training Data
The IEEE 9-bus system is considered as a test system for studying the e↵ectiveness
of the proposed method. The system is modeled in PSCAD/EMTDC, with lines
modeled as nominal pi sections and generators modeled with one axis flux decay
dynamics and their exciters are represented by the IEEE Type-1 model [61]. The line
parameters and the dynamic data of the generators are obtained from [62] and the
exciter parameters are taken from [61]. The distance relay with mho characteristics
in line 7-5 at bus 7 is selected for this study [57]. This distance relay is set to cover
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85%, 120% and full length of adjacent line for zones 1, 2 and 3, respectively. When a
power swing is detected, the distance relay elements are blocked for a preset power
swing blocking period which is typically set as 1.5-2.5 cycles [63]. The choice of
zones to be blocked depends upon the utility practice. The utility can configure
the distance relays to block all the distance zones or block zone 2 and higher while
allowing zone 1 to trip upon detection of a power swing [42]. When all the distance
zones are blocked, a symmetrical fault cannot be detected during the power swing
blocking period.
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LoadLoad
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0.79-j0.01
0.84-j0.099
5 Swing initiating 
fault locations
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0.85-j0.086
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1.0+j0.35
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32
Figure 5.1: Single line diagram of WSCC 9-Bus system showing steady state power
flow solution and location of fault simulations.
In order to generate a data set considering possible power swings of varying
slip frequency and intensity, the simulation methodology in [57] is closely followed.
This further allows for comparison of results as the data sets are similar. Power
swings of varying slip frequencies are generated by varying the characteristics of an
initiating three-phase-to-ground fault in line 7-8 as shown in Fig. 5.1. Five di↵erent
locations on the line are considered, in addition to varying the fault resistance from
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Table 5.1: Feature sets
Feature Definition
x1 Change in bus voltage magnitude (dV )
x2 Change in bus voltage angle (d V )
x3 Change in line current magnitude (dI)
x4 Change in line current angle (d I)
x5 Apparent impedance (resistance) (R)
x6 Apparent impedance (reactance) (X)
x7 Change in apparent impedance (resistance) (dR)
x8 Change in apparent impedance (reactance) (dX)
x9 Real power demand (P )
x10 Reactive power demand (Q)
x11 Change in real power demand (dP )
x12 Change in reactive power demand (dQ)
0.01-45⌦, fault duration from 200-350ms, and time instant of occurrence at each
quarter-cycle. This fault is cleared by opening breakers at both ends of the line.
After the power swing is initiated, a three-phase-to-ground fault is simulated in relay
B75’s protected zones on lines 7-5 and 5-2 with varying fault location and varying
fault resistance from 0.01-45⌦.
The resulting data set consists of 17,280 di↵erent scenarios–each consisting of
a power swing observed by relay B75, followed by a symmetrical fault in a pro-
tected zone. The duration of each simulated scenario is 3 s, with a resolution of
32 samples / cycle. After initiation, power swing waveform characteristics for 2 s
are observed before the symmetrical fault is applied. The 2 s duration allows for
the possibility of many slip cycles to be observed with the impedance rate of change
increasing after the first slip cycle [42]. Therefore, the training data includes both
stable and unstable power swings with very fast impedance rate of change. This
ensures that the data includes scenarios where discrimination between symmetrical
fault and power swing is very di cult.
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Figure 5.2: Mutual information score for 12 features described in Table I.
5.1.2 Feature Importance Ranking by Mutual Information
Prior works have shown that a wide range of signals, including measurements from
remote buses, can be used as input to classification models for symmetrical fault
detection during power swings. These include: rate of change of power swing center
voltage (d|Vs|cos )/dt, real and reactive power, dP/dt and dQ/dt, dR/dt, discrete
wavelet transform, dV/dt and dI/dt. High frequency features can be sensitive to
other switching events and also require a high sampling rate. Therefore, in this
work high frequency features and remote end measurements are not considered. The
considered features are shown in Table 5.1. Note that rate of change is computed
by comparing the consecutive samples in time. A scatter plot matrix is shown in
Fig. 5.3 for all twelve figures, illustrating the relationship between each pair of
features, with power swings shown in blue and symmetrical faults shown in red.
The histogram along the diagonal indicates the separation between each class for
each 2-dimensional feature pair.
In order to improve transparency and understanding, a systematic method of
selecting the most important features from the larger set of possible features is
required. Mutual information has been shown to be an e↵ective feature selection
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criteria [64] and is applied in this work. It is defined in [65] as follows.
I(x, y) =
X
x,y
p(x, y) ln
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
(5.1)
where p(x) is the probability distribution of X. Mutual information therefore rep-
resents the reduction in uncertainty of random variable x resulting from a new
observation of random variable y. In this application, I(x, y) is calculated between
each feature vector xi and the target variable y, with results shown in Fig. 5.2.
It can be observed that reactive power and positive sequence reactance have the
highest scores.
5.1.3 Classification Models
Numerous algorithms for the supervised learning classification problem have been
shown to be e↵ective in diverse data sets. In general, the problem considers n sam-
ples of training data belonging to two or more classes and tries to predict the class
of a new unlabeled data sample. Prior work for symmetrical fault detection during
power swings has been treated as a two-class classification problem and primarily
focuses on the e↵ectiveness of support vector machines (SVM). Although SVM clas-
sifiers can provide good accuracy, other classifiers can provide similar performance.
In this study, the five classifiers chosen to be evaluated and are listed in Table 5.2.
Each model’s performance is tuned by finding optimal parameters through 5-fold
grid-search cross-validation, with resulting tuned parameters shown in Table 5.2.
A brief description of the model and parameters follows below, with complete
details of each classification model provided in [66] and [65]. All classification models
are implemented with the Scikit-learn library [67]. First, the CART algorithm [66]
is utilized to generate a single decision tree. The parameters considered for tuning
include maximum depth ndepth, maximum number of samples per leaf nsamples, and
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Table 5.2: Tuned parameters for each classifier
Classifier Parameters
decision tree ndepth = 4, nsamples = 50, nnodes = 20
k-nearest neighbors k = 3
support vector machine C = 4096,   = 8
random forest ntrees = 50
gradient tree boosting ntrees = 500 ,   = 0.1
maximum nodes per leaf nnodes. Next, the k-nearest neighbor classification model
predicts the class of a new sample based on the distance to the k closest data points
in the training sample. The parameter k is tuned with data points weighted by
the inverse of their distance to the new sample. The SVM is implemented with the
radial basis function kernel and regularization parameter C and kernel parameter
  chosen to be the same as in [57]. The random forest algorithm combines the
predictions of multiple de-correlated decision trees in order to reduce the variance
in the predictive model; the parameter for the number of trees, ntrees, is tuned to
balance performance and training speed. Boosting is the process of sequentially
training weak predictive models, where each successive model is trained on modified
data where each successive model focuses on observations that were most di cult
for the previous model to predict. The number of iterations in the algorithm and
subsequently number of trees, ntrees, is tuned, along with the learning rate  .
5.2 Model Evaluation and Case Study
In order to estimate the predictive performance of each model, three metrics are
considered: cross-validation accuracy, test set accuracy, and area under receiver
operating characteristic (AUROC). Note that training set accuracy is not considered
as it can lead to over-fitting. Furthermore, only the five most important features
based on (5.1) and Fig. 5.2 are considered. The approach first holds out a test
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set which is generated by randomly sampling 20% of the total data set without
replacement; the remaining data is used as a training set. The data is approximately
evenly split between fault and power swing classes. Five-fold cross-validation is
performed by splitting the training data into five random subsets, training on four
of the subsets, and validating on the remaining subset. This is repeated for each of
the five folds and the average is taken as the cross-validation score. The classification
accuracy for cross-validation and the test set are shown in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Classification accuracy using five features with highest mutual informa-
tion
Classifier 5-fold CV (%) Test Set (%)
decision tree 92.06 93.41
k-nearest neighbors 93.23 94.67
support vector machine 93.67 94.71
random forest 97.83 97.84
gradient tree boosting 98.10 98.29
Classification accuracy alone, in general, is not a su cient measure of a predictive
model’s performance. Most classifiers return predicted class probabilities in addition
to binary class predictions and have a default threshold of 50%. It is therefore
important to further consider the true-positive (TPR) and false-positive rates (FPR)
as the classification threshold is varied, which is not captured in the classification
accuracy score alone. In particular, power system protection is designed for high
security and is largely averse to false-positive misoperation of relays (where faults
are the positive class). Typically a trade-o↵ has to be made between TPR and
FPR. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) and area under the curve is an
appropriate method to summarize both types of errors [66]. The ROC plots the
FPR versus TPR as the classification threshold is varied and is shown for the five
classifiers in Fig. 5.4. The ROC curves for random forest (rf) and gradient tree
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boosting (gbc) show a significant advantage for maintaining a high TPR without
incurring larger FPR.
An illustrative power swing scenario is held out from the training data and is
shown in Fig. 5.5. The time-domain voltage and current waveforms of phase A show
a power swing occurring 1.8 to 2.7 s, after which a symmetrical fault is observed. The
impedance trajectories observed by relay at B75 and corresponding output from the
random forest classifier are also shown. It can be observed that the predicted class
transitions from 1 to 0 accurately when the fault occurs. The predicted probability
of fault also rises sharply. The susceptibility to false-positive can be further tuned
by adjusting the classification threshold above 50% probability.
5.3 Summary
Supervised learning classification models can have excellent performance in find-
ing decision boundaries in high-dimensional spaces that minimize the classification
error rate. However, there is an inherent trade-o↵ between predictive model per-
formance and interpretability of the model and results. Fig. 5.6 further illustrates
that additional relevant features can greatly improve classification rates. Including
all 12 features can achieve accuracy over 99%. On the other hand, a model utilizing
only two features such as R and X (as in conventional distance relays) is greatly
interpretable. Even with machine learning models, often considered as black boxes,
it allows for novel visualizations that makes the results more intuitive and under-
standable. For example, a random forest classifier is trained only using R and X
as features, with the training data for both power swings and symmetrical faults
plotted in Fig. 5.7. The predicted class probabilities from the model are plotted
as contours, with the scale shown at right. It can be observed that the visual-
ization provides great intuition and provides confidence for predictions on unseen
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data. Even with only two features, accuracy is greater than 90%. To conclude, a
supervised learning approach for detecting faults during power swings and focused
on both interpretability and performance has been presented. Results indicate per-
formance of classifiers on par with prior models, while providing intuitive evaluation
and visualization methods.
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Figure 5.4: ROC and AUROC comparing e↵ectiveness of each classifier.
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Figure 5.6: Classification error rate on test set as a function of the number of input
features. Features are added sequentially in order of decreasing importance.
Figure 5.7: Predicted probability contours for random forest classifier. Data for
faults and power swings are shown from training set.
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Chapter 6
Stochastic Optimization of
Discrete Overcurrent Relay
Characteristics
This chapter develops the calculation of relay operating settings formulated as a
stochastic optimization problem. In classical distribution networks, the system is
designed for unidirectional power flow in radial feeders. Distributed generators in-
troduce variable output sources that can impact fault current levels observed by
protective relays, causing loss of coordination and unwanted operations. As pen-
etration of DGs increases in the distribution system, a more complex protection
system is required to ensure secure and reliable operation. At present, most utilities
in North America require that DGs downstream of protection be de-energized when
the protective relay senses a disturbance and opens a circuit breaker [17]. This en-
sures that DGs have minimal impact on existing protection schemes. However, fast
reclosing schemes for temporary faults introduce additional challenges. Proper coor-
dination is required so that the recloser waits long enough to allow downstream DGs
to disconnect (known as anti-islanding detection) before the breaker is reclosed [68].
Overcurrent relays typically follow an inverse time operating characteristic that
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allows for coordination between primary and backup relays. Coordination is achieved
by delaying relays that are further upstream with some minimum amount of time
delay, called the coordination time interval (CTI). The CTI represents uncertainty
in the exact time a relay should open and captures the lack of precision due to
factors such as current transformer errors, dc o↵set, fault impedance, and primary
breaker failure. Operation of relays closest to the substation, however, can become
slow if there are multiple relays needing coordination to accommodate CTIs and
breaker operating times between each relay.
Furthermore, distribution systems are conventionally designed for unidirectional
power flow with radial feeders. A high penetration of distributed generators (DGs)
can a↵ect fault current levels, contributing to protection coordination issues in fault
detection and loss of selectivity [69–71]. The severity depends on the type and
location of DGs, with synchronous DGs having the most impact. The impact to
protection coordination from inverter-based DGs is less significant due of the ability
to limit fault current and disconnect during faults. However, large photovoltaic
(PV) generation on a distribution feeder can still cause varying fault current levels
observed by protective relays and a↵ect relay operating times [72–74]. For example,
the ability of relays to sense faults can be a↵ected on long branches with large DG
generation due to reduced current at the substation breaker when downstream DGs
are feeding the fault.
Several approaches have been proposed to improve the performance of protec-
tive relays in distribution systems. The conventional practice is to perform a relay
coordination study of the worst-case fault scenarios and set each relay sequentially
until full coordination is achieved in the system. This goal can be formulated as an
optimization problem, where the objective is to minimize the sum of all relay oper-
ating times in the system with constraints to enforce coordination and selectivity.
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This approach was introduced in [27], where the objective function minimizes the
weighted sum of all relay operating times over possible time-dial and pickup settings.
This framework is further developed in [28], where an adaptive scheme is introduced.
A heuristic approach is presented in [75] combining a genetic algorithm (GA) with a
linear program subproblem for increased computational e ciency. In [76], a meta-
heurstic and linear programming algorithm is introduced to optimize coordination
of directional overcurrent relays considering grid and islanded operation. In [77]
a fuzzy-based GA is proposed for overcurrent relay coordination in interconnected
networks and [78] considers DG location with optimal relay coordination using GA.
In [79], a communications-based protection algorithm using blocking schemes is
proposed. An adaptive scheme is proposed in [80] with settings depending on the
grid connected or islanded mode of operation. In general, results have shown im-
provement in protection system speed and performance by minimizing fault clearing
times.
Prior formulations to optimize overcurrent relay coordination, however, have
applied an objective function minimizing the total sum of operating times for near
and far end faults. These approaches, while e↵ective, are further restrained to relay
tripping times following the shape of the specified characteristic equation. In this
work, a stochastic mixed-integer linear program (MILP) is formulated to minimize
a relay’s tripping time at discrete fault current intervals and considers the cost of
tripping a relay as the objective function. The formulation takes into account the
probabilistic nature of the fault current observed at each relay, which can be im-
pacted by fault location, fault resistance, breaker failure, and DG output. Monte
Carlo simulation is used to determine the empirical probabilities of each relay ob-
serving a particular fault current. Linear constraints are formulated for multiple
relays to require selective and coordinated operation with downstream devices. The
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concept is illustrated in Fig. 6.1 where the characteristic of relay i is determined
by optimizing tripping time tij for each jth current interval. The resulting MILP is
solved with the commercial solver CPLEX [81] and is shown to have fast solution
times even for large systems and thousands of fault scenarios. The fast solution
time further allows for the capability of adaptive relaying to change tripping char-
acteristics based on fault current probabilities. Compared to prior approaches, the
proposed method results in an optimal solution with a decrease in expected energy
disconnected due to faults by over 11% for 10 000 Monte Carlo fault scenarios. The
remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The proposed stochastic MILP
formulation is described in Section 6.1. The proposed approach is then applied to
a simple radial test system in Section 6.2 to demonstrate its performance in com-
parison with conventional approaches. Scenarios with probabilistic models for DG
are then studied in Section 6.3. The results are discussed in Section 6.4 and final
conclusions in Section 6.5.
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Figure 6.1: Conceptual illustration with conventional curve on left and proposed
approach on right where the characteristic of relay i is determined by optimizing
tripping time tij for each jth current interval.
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6.1 Proposed Stochastic Optimization Formulation
6.1.1 Problem Formulation
In each of the prior methods discussed previously, the time-delayed tripping char-
acteristic is defined by an analytic function that continuously maps measured fault
current to a time-delay. The proposed approach, rather than trying to find an op-
timal curve, instead seeks to directly find an optimal operating time, tij , associated
with each possible value of fault current j for every relay i in the network. To sim-
plify the problem, the continuous space of possible fault currents, j, is discretized
into m discrete levels. The problem is then formulated as a stochastic MILP whose
objective is to minimize expected energy loss for customers and distributed gener-
ators in the network due to faults. The solution of this problem yields an optimal
set of operating times {t?ij} for all possible fault currents and defines a piecewise
constant function specifying each relay’s tripping characteristic.
The MILP is first formulated and applied to a simple radial distribution feeder.
The feeder is protected by a total of n relays, with each relay protecting one of n
discrete sections. Aggregated customer load and distributed generation is connected
to each bus. The system load current and the fault contribution of distributed gen-
eration will change over time. Therefore, the optimal tripping times are determined
at each relay such that only the nearest relay trips for any fault on the feeder. The
notation is defined below.
Sets:
! 2 ⌦ set of fault scenarios
i 2 I set of line-sections, I = {1, 2, ..., n}
j 2 J set of discretized current levels, J = {1, 2, ...,m}
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Data:
(i!, j!, R!)fault scenario !
i! is the faulted line-section in scenario !,
i! 2 I
j! the observed fault-current level in scenario !, j! 2 J
R! the set of line-sections that have functional relays that observe the
fault in scenario !, R! ✓ I
⇢! the probability of observing the fault scenario !, ! 2 ⌦
DGi distributed generation in line-section i, i 2 I
Custi aggregated customer load connected to line-section i, i 2 I
Ci the total customer load and distributed generation in MVA on line-
section i, where Ci = DGi + Custi, i 2 I
  time duration a breaker stays open to clear fault if reclosing is deployed
  sum of relay sense time and breaker operating time. Relay sense time
is time a relay needs to identify a fault. Breaker operating time is the
mechanical operating time of the breaker.
 ij discretized melting time for a fuse in line-section i on observing a
fault-current level j
  scalar parameter for controlling conservativeness of the relay charac-
teristics
M a su ciently large constant
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Variables:
tij the operating time for relay in line-section i on observing a fault-current
level j
L! the energy loss associated with a fault scenario !
V ! the shortest operating time of all functional relays observing a fault,
V ! = minr2R! tr,j!
y!i is a binary variable that equals 1 if the relay in line-section i has a minimal
operating time for fault scenario !, and equals 0 otherwise
x!i is a binary variable that equals 1 if the customers in line-section i lose
power under fault scenario !, and 0 otherwise
fij discretized melting time for a fuse in line-section i on observing a fault-
current level j
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The model is formulated as follows:
min
tij
X
!
⇢! · L! (6.1)
s.t. L! = (V ! +  )
nX
a=i!
Ca +  
i! 1X
a=0
x!aCa 8! 2 ⌦ (6.2)
tij!   V ! 8! 2 ⌦, 8i 2 R! (6.3)
tij!  V ! + (1  y!i ) ·M 8! 2 ⌦, 8i 2 R! (6.4)X
i2R!
y!i   1 8! 2 ⌦, 8i 2 R! (6.5)
y!i  x!i 8! 2 ⌦, 8i 2 R! (6.6)
x!i 1  x!i 8! 2 ⌦, 8i 2 I   {0} (6.7)
V !   tij! +  (  +  ij!)  x!i  (  +  ij!)
8! 2 ⌦, 8i 2 R! (6.8)
fij =  ij 8j 2 J, 8i 2 I (6.9)
tij +    ti 1j 8j 2 J, 8i 2 I   {0} (6.10)
x!i 2 {0, 1} 8! 2 ⌦, 8i 2 R! (6.11)
y!i 2 {0, 1} 8! 2 ⌦, 8i 2 R! (6.12)
Faults are considered to occur with randomly distributed fault impedance, lo-
cation, and pre-fault system loading. Therefore the faulted line-section, i, and
observed fault current, j, are random variables to model this behavior. In radial
systems, sequential relays provide a backup functionality when the primary relay
fails to clear a fault by time-grading its operation. To model this functionality, for
each fault at location i and fault current j, circuit breakers at each relay location
may be considered to be malfunctioning, resulting in a stochastic set of line-sections
with functional relays that observe the fault, R. The term fault scenario describes
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all these factors and many fault scenarios are possible. A particular fault scenario,
denoted by !, is defined as ! = {i!, j!, R!}.
Let tij be the operating time for relay in line-section i on observing a fault-
current level j in a radial system. The objective is to obtain an optimal operating
time for each relay considering varying output of distributed generators and loads
while aiming to minimize the expected value of the energy loss, L!, corresponding to
each potential fault scenario !. The loss function L! defines the energy disconnected
in each fault scenario. Energy disconnected due to relay operations is a natural
choice for the loss function as it corresponds to typical reliability indices, such as
SAIDI and CAIDI [82].
6.1.2 Explanation of Constraints
Constraints (6.2) - (6.12) link the relay operating time tij and the loss function L!
by requiring that relays operate in a coordinated and selective manner. Constraint
(6.2) indicates that L! can be split into two summands: 1) the amount of load and
generation in the line-sections downstream to the fault, and 2) the amount of load
and generation in the line-sections upstream to the fault. The first summand in
constraint (6.2) indicates that load and generation downstream to the fault will lose
power during the fault and clearing time. The second summand indicates that load
and generation upstream to the fault will lose power only during fault clearing time.
The binary variables x!a indicate whether line-section a loses power.
Constraint (6.3) indicates that V ! is smaller than or equal to the operating time
of all the functional relays observing the fault current. Constraint (6.4) indicates
that if the relay at line-section i in scenario ! trips, the operating time of that relay
is the shortest operating time of all the relays observing the fault current. If the
relay does not trip, (6.4) becomes a redundant constraint. The purpose of constraint
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(6.3) and (6.4) is to guarantee that V ! is the shortest operating time of all the relays
observing the fault current. Constraint (6.5) indicates that for each scenario, there
is at least one relay tripping. Constraint (6.6) requires that if y!i = 1 (i.e., the relay
of line-section i in scenario ! trips), then x!i = 1, and the customers at line-section
i in scenario ! lose power. Constraint (6.7) ensures that if line-section i loses power,
so do any line-sections downstream from i. Constraint (6.8) ensures that relays
whose trip time is within  (  +  ij!) of the minimum trip time for a scenario also
trip and requires that relays operate slower than the downstream fuses, allowing
them to clear the fault first.
If V !   tij! +  (  +  ij!) > 0, then x!i must equal one to satisfy the constraint.
Otherwise, if V !   tij! +  (  +  ij!)  0, then x!i can be zero. Constraint (6.9)
simulates the TCC curve of the fuse and constraint (6.10) requires a backup relay to
operate slower than a primary relay by a duration of  . Constraints (6.11) and (6.12)
require x!i and y
!
i to be binary variables. The scalar parameter   allows adjust-
ment of the overall speed of the characteristics without violating other constraints
in model (6.1). Increasing   will increase the operating time, tij , in the regions of j
where fault current distributions overlap and allows for control of the conservative-
ness of relay characteristics or further coordination with fixed-characteristic devices
such as fuses. This model is applicable to any radial distribution topology.
6.2 Case Study: Simple Radial Test System
The simple radial system shown in Fig. 6.2 is used to demonstrate performance of
the proposed approach in comparison with conventional and parameter optimization
approaches. The simple test system is a three-bus system with data from [41], shown
in Table 6.1. The relays are coordinated with minimum CTI = 0.3 s and breaker
operating time of 5 cycles (0.083 s). Only three-phase and single line-to-ground
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Figure 6.2: Single-line diagram of a simplified radial distribution system.
faults are considered.
Table 6.1: System Data
Bus Max Load (MVA) Max If (A)
0 11 3000
1 4 2000
2 6 1000
6.2.1 Illustrative Example
An illustrative example is first presented to provide intuition on how the model
calculates optimal tripping times. Assume only two fault scenarios (! = {0, 1}) are
possible for the three line-sections (i = {0, 1, 2}) corresponding to Fig. 6.2. The fault
current observed by relays r0, r1, and r2 is discretized into three levels (j = {0, 1, 2})
as follows, where If is given in amperes:
j =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0, 500  If  1000
1, 1000 < If  2000
2, 2000 < If  3000
(6.13)
The fault scenario data for this example is listed in Table 6.2. In scenario 0,
a fault occurs in the most downstream line-section, i = 2, resulting in the lowest
fault current level 0 with i0 = 2 and j0 = 0. All three relays are functional and
observe the fault current, R0 = {0, 1, 2}. In scenario 1, a fault occurs in line-section
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i = 1, resulting in fault current level 0 with i1 = 1 and j1 = 0. Relays 0 and 1
are functional and observe the fault current, so R1 = {0, 1}. Finally, assume that
scenario 0 is more likely to occur than scenario 1 and so di↵erent probabilities are
assigned for each scenario: ⇢0 = 0.75, ⇢1 = 0.25.
Table 6.2: Two fault scenario data
Scenario, ! i! j! R! ⇢!
0 2 0 0, 1, 2 0.75
1 1 0 0,1 0.25
The maximum load in each line-section is considered from Table 6.1, with C0 =
11 MVA, C1 = 4 MVA, C2 = 6 MVA. The amount of time required to clear the fault
is   = 1 s and the sum of relay sense time and breaker operating time is   = 0.2 s. The
parameter   = 1 and no fuses are in the system. By solving the MILP model, the
optimal relay operating times are found to be t00 = 0.4 s, t10 = 0.2 s and t20 = 0 s.
V ! can be obtained for each scenario by choosing the shortest relay operating time in
the scenario. V 0 = min(t00, t10, t20) = min(0.4, 0.2, 0) = 0 s. Similarly, V 1 = 0.2 s.
The constraints (6.5) - (6.12) restrict relays to operate in a selective and co-
ordinated manner. For example, consider scenario 0, where y0· = (0, 0, 1) and
x0· = (0, 0, 1). This indicates that the relay in line-section 2 is the one that clears the
fault, and that only line-section 2 loses power. Similarly, for scenario 1, y1· = (0, 1, 0)
and x1· = (0, 1, 1) indicates that the relay in line-section 1 clears the fault, and only
line-sections 1 and 2 lose power. Given the values of the x! and V ! variables, it
is straightforward to calculate the expected energy loss in each scenario through
constraint (6.2). For scenario 0, it is L0 = 6(V 0+1)+11x00+4x
0
1 = 6. Similarly, for
scenario 1, it is L1 = (V 1+1)⇥ (4 + 6)+ 11x10 = 12. The overall objective function
value is then ⇢0L0 + ⇢1L1 = 0.75 ⇥ 6 + 0.25 ⇥ 12 = 7.5. This result matches with
the optimal objective function value.
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Note that in this illustrative example, there are only two scenarios and one
current level. Without scenarios for current levels 1 and 2, the model e↵ectively
treats faults at these current levels as having probability zero. As such, the model
does not compute relay operating times for these current levels. In other words,
in order to compute optimal tripping times for a particular current level, scenarios
with faults at that current level must be present in the data.
6.2.2 Comparison with Conventional Settings
In this section, performance of the proposed approach is compared with conventional
TCC curves. The relays in the system are specified as operating on the standard
inverse time-current characteristic curve and the trip time ttrip in seconds can be
expressed as specified in (6.14) for M > 1
ttrip = TDS
✓
A
MP   1 + B
◆
, (6.14)
where TDS is the time dial setting, Ipickup is the relay pickup setting, M is the
measured current in multiples of Ipickup, and {P, A, B} are constants chosen to
emulate specific TCC curve shapes [41]. The analytic equation implemented by
microprocessor relays and conforming to the IEEE C37.112-1996 Standard Inverse
Time Characteristic Equations is utilized for the TCC curve, with A = 5.95, B =
0.18, and P = 2 in (6.14). Setting each relay with coordination for maximum fault
current, the time-dial setting (TDS) and tap-setting (TS) are determined, with the
results shown in Table 6.3.
For the comparison, all 18 possible fault scenarios are simulated for relays oper-
ating with both conventional settings and optimized tripping times. The scenario
data is shown in Table 6.4. The aggregated load at each bus, Ci, is given in units
of MVA with values as specified in Table 6.1. In this example, all possible com-
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Table 6.3: Relay Data
Relay Curve CT Ratio TS TDS
r0 CO-8 400:5 5 3
r1 CO-8 200:5 5 2
r2 CO-8 200:5 3 1/2
binations of fault location, fault current, and functional relays are chosen. The
maximum expected fault current at each bus is specified in Table 6.1 and fault
current is discretized into three levels as in the illustrative example.
The probability of observing each fault scenario, ⇢!, is calculated with the fol-
lowing assumptions. Circuit breaker failure is modeled as a failure to open. In this
study, the circuit breaker failure rate,  cb, is considered to be once per 50 000 com-
mands to open [83]. Relay failure is modeled as failure to trip and the numerical
relay failure rate,  r, is considered to be 0.018 [84]. Therefore, the probability of
protection failure at each relay location  i = 1  (1  cb)(1  r). In the context of
relay coordination, a backup relay should operate only if the primary relay or circuit
breaker fails to open during a fault. It is also assumed that the line-sections are of
equal length and therefore have equal exposure to faults and equal probability for
each line-section [85].
Using the settings in Table 6.3 and the maximum If for each current level, the
operating relay and associated operating times, ttrip, are obtained for each fault
scenario. Note that the maximum continuous current If in each discrete current
level is chosen to provide a comparison of the conventional settings at its fastest
operating time, for each current level j. The operating times are then inserted into
the cost function, L!, to compute the expected energy loss for the conventional
settings. This value is calculated to be 20.070. The same scenarios are then used as
data for the MILP formulation given by model (6.1). The problem is solved with a
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Table 6.4: Simplified fault scenario data
Scenario, ! i! j! Functional Relays, R! ⇢!
1 2 0 0, 1, 2 0.076002
2 2 1 0, 1, 2 0.253339
3 2 2 0, 1, 2 0
4 2 0 0, 1 0.001370
5 2 1 0, 1 0.004565
6 2 2 0, 1 0
7 2 0 0 0.000025
8 2 1 0 0.000082
9 2 2 0 0
10 1 0 0, 1 0
11 1 1 0, 1 0.109780
12 1 2 0, 1 0.219561
13 1 0 0 0
14 1 1 0 0.001978
15 1 2 0 0.003956
16 0 0 0 0
17 0 1 0 0
18 0 2 0 0.329341
total solution time of 0.032 s. The value of the objective function at the optimum is
13.998. The optimal coordinated relay operating times, tij , are plotted in Fig. 6.3
as ti,op where i corresponds to relay ri.
First, it can be observed that the proposed approach improves upon the expected
loss, reducing it from 20.070 to 13.998 (see Table 6.6). This is a direct result
of finding shorter relay tripping times, tij , at all current levels. Next, it can be
observed that the solution defines an inverse step function, which follows intuition
as time-grading facilitates coordination between relays. The constraints defined in
model (6.1) force the relay operations to be coordinated for all fault scenarios. It is
observed that the relay r2 at the end of the feeder operates nearly instantaneously.
Because relay r2 is protecting the end of the line, if any fault current is observed,
the relay should operate without any intentional time-delay. Similarly for relays r1
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and r0, the tripping operation is only delayed enough to give the primary relay time
to operate. If fault current is observed past this delay, the relay no longer needs to
wait and will trip. In comparison with conventional TCC curves at all fault current
levels, there is no excess delay beyond what is required for the downstream relay and
breaker to operate. It is observed in Fig. 6.3 that as the TDS values increase, large
delays are incurred for smaller fault currents due to the shape of the TCC curve.
The proposed approach, therefore, eliminates these excess delays while taking into
account the necessary uncertainties.
6.2.3 Comparison With Parameter Optimization Approach
In this section the proposed approach is compared with a relay parameter opti-
mization formulation to minimize the sum of relay operating times for all near-end
faults [28]. The simplified formulation is provided in model (6.15).
min
TDSi
nX
i=1
witi (6.15)
s.t.tj   ti   CTI 8(i, j) 2 ⌦ (6.16)
ti = ai ⇥ TDSi (6.17)
ai =
k
(Impu)n   1 (6.18)
where ti = time delay of relay i for a near-end fault, n = number of relays, and wi =
likelihood a fault occurs in a given zone (set to one). The coordination constraints
are specified in (6.16) and ensure that the delay between primary and backup relays
are greater than the CTI. Constraints (6.17) and (6.18) restrict the relay to operate
on a specified TCC curve. The problem reduces to a linear program by considering
ai as a constant for specific near-end fault current, Impu.
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of proposed optimal tripping characteristic with parame-
ter optimization of TCC curves approach. The proposed approach provides faster
operating times for all fault currents.
The parameter optimization approach is then solved for the same test system as
both a linear program and as an integer program (IP) by considering discrete values
of TDS. The solution to this model minimizes the sum of all relay operating times.
By inserting the ti = aiTDSi values obtained from the parameter optimization model
into the objective function (6.1), it is shown that the result is only marginally better
than the conventional relay settings. A comparison of the conventional TDS solution
with that of the parameter optimization approach is shown in Table 6.5. It can be
observed that if the parameter optimization model is solved as an integer program,
the solution, TDSIP *, is nearly identical to the conventional setting approach. The
linear program solution, TDSLP *, provides only marginally faster operating times.
The objective function value of each approach is compared in Table 6.6 and operating
times from the linear program solution are compared in Fig. 6.3, shown as ti,LP for
each relay.
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Table 6.5: Comparison of Optimal Settings
Relay Curve TS TDSconv TDSIP * TDSLP *
r0 inverse 5 3 3 2.530
r1 inverse 5 2 2 1.489
r2 inverse 3 1/2 0 0
Table 6.6: Total Expected Energy Loss From Relay Operations
Relay Setting Approach Objective Function Value
Conventional TCC 20.070
Parameter Optimization, IP 19.856
Parameter Optimization, LP 18.540
Proposed Approach 13.998
6.3 Case Study: IEEE 34-Node Feeder
In this section, the IEEE 34-Node radial distribution feeder is used to demonstrate
the proposed approach in the presence of uncertainty due to DG output. The
test feeder is specifically chosen for its topology, availability of load and short-
circuit data, and DG integration studies [86–89]. The feeder can be characterized as
long and lightly loaded, supplied from a 69kV/24.9kV substation transformer that
operates on a 2.5 MVA base. The total load on the feeder is 1.769 MW. The single-
line diagram of the test feeder is shown in Fig. 6.4 with locations for overcurrent
relays and DG modified from [86] and [87].
6.3.1 Probabilistic Fault Scenarios with DG
Renewable-based DG can impact the available fault current levels and result in bidi-
rectional flows on the feeder. In such cases, directional overcurrent relays (DOCRs)
can be utilized to maintain sensitivity and selectivity. The proposed approach is
readily applied with DOCR schemes in radial systems simply by applying model
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Figure 6.4: IEEE 34-node test feeder with modified protection and DG locations.
(6.1) to the set of relays looking in the same direction. For example, if the relays
shown in Fig. 6.4 are considered to be looking in the forward direction, model (6.1)
is applied only to these relays and separately to solve for the coordinated charac-
teristics of the set of relays looking in the reverse direction. In this section, a solar
PV generation plant is connected to the three-phase node 850 and is modeled using
the methodology in [87]. The PV plant is sized at 700 kW, corresponding to 40%
penetration, to study the impact to the optimal characteristics. PV output for the
next hour is modeled by a Beta distribution function [90] and two scenarios are
considered for maximum solar irradiance:
1. low irradiance, corresponding to a maximum of 14%
2. full irradiance, corresponding to a maximum of 100%
The scenarios represent probability distributions corresponding to solar irradiance
for di↵erent times of day or forecasted weather conditions.
Furthermore, fault location is considered to be uniformly distributed with respect
to the length of each line-section and the relay locations are chosen to approximately
equalize the probability of faults on the resulting zones. Fault resistance is charac-
terized by a high probability of small resistance and a maximum resistance of 40
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⌦ [91]. It can be modeled as a discrete or continuous random variable following
a Beta and Weibull distribution functions; the Weibull distribution is chosen to
model fault resistance. The system is modeled in OpenDSS [92] and probabilistic
fault scenarios are simulated resulting in a distribution of fault currents at each relay
location. The distributions of fault current observed at each relay over 10 000 Monte
Carlo simulations are shown in Fig. 6.5a and Fig. 6.5b with mean µ and standard
deviation  , respectively for both irradiance scenarios.
6.3.2 Optimal Tripping Characteristics
The simulation data is then input to the model (6.1) to solve for optimal relay
tripping times. With more data available for this test system, the number of current
discretization levels is chosen as 20 uniformly sized bins in fault current. The size of
the resulting optimization problem is much larger compared to the simple radial test
system in Section 6.2. The number of current levels has increased from 3 to 20 and
the number of scenarios has increased from 18 to 10 000. However, the problem is
solved in a reasonable time, with an optimal solution found in 8.77 s. The resulting
optimal characteristics are shown in Fig. 6.5c and 6.5d.
It is first observed from Fig. 6.5a and Fig. 6.5b that the mean of the distribution
for relay 1 decreases due to the DG downstream and the mean of the distribution
for relay 2 increases due to the DG upstream. Although the changes in fault current
are relatively small, an average decrease of less than 1A for relay 1 and an average
increase of less than 10A for relay 2, the overlap between distributions has increased
as shown in Fig. 6.5b. The result corresponds to more uncertainty in whether the
fault is located in the primary relay’s protected zone. The subsequent optimal
tripping characteristics in Fig. 6.5d show that as the uncertainty (i.e., the overlap
between distributions) increases, the tripping time becomes more conservative. This
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Figure 6.5: Distribution of fault currents observed at each relay for 10 000 Monte
Carlo fault scenarios are shown for (a) 14% and (b) 100% maximum irradiance sce-
narios for a 700 kW distributed generator at node 850. The corresponding optimal
characteristics are shown with   = 1.5. in (c) and (d), respectively.
can be observed in the characteristics for relay 1 where the tripping time for fault
currents in the range 250 to 275 A has increased, exactly the range where there
is more overlap with faults located downstream of relay 2. The proposed model
produces an optimal solution for this data, allowing relay 2 to clear faults in its
protected zone with increased fault current due to the DG. Conversely, when the
fault current contribution from DG is expected to be low as in Fig. 6.5a, the
proposed model finds faster optimal characteristics.
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In comparison with the conventional approaches, the optimal characteristics pro-
vide faster operating times for all current levels. The resulting objective function
value over all 10 000 scenarios for conventional TCC, LP parameter optimization,
and the proposed approach is 2.058, 1.816, and 1.707, respectively. The proposed
approach therefore provides a 6% decrease in expected energy loss compared to the
fastest TCC characteristics provided by the LP parameter optimization approach.
Additional performance gains up to 11.5% can be achieved by further reducing the
conservativeness parameter   to 1.
6.4 Discussion
The results in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 demonstrate that the proposed approach finds
optimal tripping characteristics for fast to instantaneous operation at high fault
currents and reduced tripping times at lower fault currents. The proposed approach
is also demonstrated as an adaptive scheme by considering sets of probability dis-
tributions for di↵erent operating conditions. The probability of each fault scenario
! depends upon the fault location i!, observed fault-current level j! and the re-
liability of the protective relays R!. Therefore, di↵erent fault scenario probability
distributions can be considered for seasonal changes, imminent storm conditions, or
based on forecasted DG output [93]. Even for large data sets, the proposed MILP
can be solved quickly, providing the capability for relay tripping characteristics to
be updated on a reasonable time-horizon, such as every hour. Ideally for a large
distribution network the protection system should minimize the loads disconnected
due to any fault clearing operation. Therefore, another benefit is to potentially
allow more relays to be coordinated in a distribution network. Relays operating
with existing TCC curves, however, may be limited by unacceptable time-delays
introduced from multiple devices coordinated in series.
96
Practical issues for implementation also need to be considered as the proposed
approach requires microprocessor-based overcurrent relays to operate on a charac-
teristic di↵erent than existing TCC curves. It is shown in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 that
the solution of the proposed MILP results in an optimal operating characteristic
that is an inverse piecewise constant function mapping observed fault current to an
optimal tripping time. Consequently, programming of relays to operate on this opti-
mal characteristic will not require more computational power than what is presently
utilized in existing relays.
Another consideration regarding implementation is with respect to the fault sce-
nario data. An example of the data required to solve the proposed optimization
model is provided in Table 6.4. Monte Carlo simulations can be run o↵-line to gen-
erate the necessary input to the proposed model. Historical or vendor provided data
can be used to estimate the circuit breaker failure rates and fault incidence per mile.
As updated estimates of fault probabilities and load profiles are made available, the
fault scenario probabilities ⇢! can be updated accordingly. The proposed approach
can thus take advantage of more information as it becomes available in the future.
6.5 Summary
In summary, this chapter proposes a stochastic mixed-integer linear program to de-
termine optimal tripping characteristics for overcurrent relays in radial distribution
systems. The objective is to minimize the expected value of load and generation
disconnected due to relay operations. Case studies are performed on a three-bus ra-
dial distribution feeder and performance is compared with conventional approaches.
Case studies with distributed generation are preformed on the IEEE 34-Node Test
Feeder. Results show that the proposed approach finds faster operating times and
maintains coordination without needing communication between relays.
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Chapter 7
Optimal Allocation of
Protective Devices in
Distribution Systems
The location of protective devices and isolating switches is a key factor impacting the
reliability performance of distribution networks. Devices such as circuit breakers,
reclosers, sectionalizers, and fuses operate automatically to detect and clear faults.
Isolating and tie switches (ISs and TSs) operate to allow healthy sections of the cir-
cuit to be restored either manually or automatically. In general, as more devices are
installed, network reliability improves as faults impact fewer customers. However,
the trade-o↵ is the installation and maintenance cost of each device. Distributed
generators (DGs) connected through tie switches can further improve reliability if
intentional islanding is allowed [94–96].
Therefore, the allocation of protective devices and switches can be formulated
as an optimization problem to minimize the expected total reliability cost, which
is typically composed of a cost-based reliability index and the cost of the devices
themselves. However, prior work has often made simplifications to consider a relaxed
problem. For example, the allocation of reclosers, fuses, and sectionalizers are often
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considered as an independent problem from isolating switch allocation [97–99]. Fur-
thermore, sectionalizers have been considered functionally identical to reclosers. As
a result, the models do not capture the full interaction between devices and therefore
do not fully account for the impact to reliability. A second simplification is to divide
a feeder into main line and lateral sections while aggregating loads on the secondary
circuit instead of considering the full system topology [97, 98]. The simplification
restricts the solution by reducing the number of possible device locations.
A third simplification is to ignore the impact of momentary interruptions and
the trade-o↵ between momentary/sustained interruptions [97–102]. There is an
increasing need to incorporate the economic losses of customers due to momentary
interruptions and other power quality events [103]. Depending on the frequency of
temporary faults and the sensitivity of electronic equipment in the system, this cost
can be significant. A fourth simplification is to ignore the capability for distributed
generators to sustain temporary islands while the faulted section is repaired. This
practice is not yet commonly applied, but as distributed generators become more
prevalent, it is important to consider this possibility [97–99,101,102]. Lastly, several
models use a non-linear formulation to describe the dependencies between protective
devices and their impact to reliability indices. The problem can be solved with
heuristic algorithms, however, they cannot guarantee optimality and may be slow
to converge for large systems [100,101,104].
In this chapter, a new formulation is presented that comprehensively considers
the key factors impacting reliability in distribution networks without making the
above simplifications. The formulation relies on representing the full distribution
network as a directed graph to consider the complete interactions between devices.
The specific impact of each protection device type (circuit breaker, recloser, section-
alizer, fuse) and isolating switch is further modeled, e.g., momentary interruptions
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caused by reclosers are considered. As the number of network nodes becomes larger,
however, the optimization problem becomes more di cult to solve. The proposed
approach addresses this challenge by applying e cient graph search algorithms on
the directed graph representation to pre-process the network data for each node.
The approach facilitates the formulation of a mixed-integer linear program (MILP),
which is significant because the global optimal solution can be computed in a rea-
sonable time. It further allows for practical comparison of solutions for multiple
scenarios of DG location and capacity.
7.1 Notation and Data Preprocessing
In this section, the mathematical notation for the sets, parameters, and decision
variables used in the MILP formulation are first defined. A description of the process
for translating device models and distribution system data for graph representation
is then presented. Finally, the process of determining feasible nodes for isolating
switches performing downstream restoration operations is described.
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7.1.1 Notation
Sets:
I set of nodes in the tree
Ui set of nodes upstream to i, including i, i 2 I
Di set of nodes downstream to i, including i, i 2 I
Bik set of nodes downstream to k and upstream to i, Bik = Dk \ Ui, i 2
I, k 2 Ui
B0ik set of nodes downstream to k but not downstream to i, B
0
ik = Dk \Dci ,
i 2 I, k 2 Ui
ML set of nodes on the main line
O source node of the network system
V set of devices: reclosers (R), fuse-blowing fuses (F  ), fuse-saving fuses
(F  ), sectionalizers (S), isolating switches (IS) and circuit breaker (CB).
V = {R,F   , F  , S, IS, CB}, where the circuit breaker is used and only
used in the source node
Parameters:
 i probability of temporary fault in i, i 2 I
 i probability of permanent fault in i, i 2 I
C i sustained outage cost per load per unit time in i, i 2 I
C i momentary outage cost per load per unit time in i, i 2 I
r  momentary outage time
rF
 
ik outage time if the fault in i is cleared by fuse-blowing fuse in k, i 2 I,
k 2 Ui
101
rF
 
ik outage time if the permanent fault in i is cleared by fuse-saving fuse in
k, i 2 I, k 2 Ui
rv
 
ik outage time if the temporary fault in i is cleared by device v in k, i 2 I,
k 2 Ui, v 2 {R,CB}
rv
 
ik outage time if the permanent fault in i is cleared by device v in k, i 2 I,
k 2 Ui, v 2 {R,CB}
rvc replacement time of device v, v 2 {F   , F  , CB}
Ni number of customers in node i, i 2 I
Li amount of energy consumption (kW) in node i, i 2 I
m number of times the recloser trips
nv number of available device v, v 2 V
Cv unit cost of device v, v 2 V
B budget for devices
avi equals 1 if there is device v in node i, 0 otherwise, v 2 {TS,DG}, i 2 I
DGi DG capacity in node i, i 2 I
u utilization of DG
Variables:
ECOST system expected interruption cost
CD device cost
CT expected cost due to temporary fault
CP expected cost due to permanent fault
xvk equals 1 if a device v is placed in k, 0 otherwise, k 2 I, v 2 V
y vik equals 1 if temporary fault in i is cleared by device v in k, 0 otherwise,
i 2 I, k 2 Ui, v 2 {R,F   , CB}
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y vik equals 1 if permanent fault in i is cleared by device v in k, 0 otherwise,
i 2 I, k 2 Ui, v 2 {R,F   , F  , CB}
Svikj equals 1 if the permanent fault in i is cleared by the recloser in k, there’s
a device v in j, and v is working to keep some customers from losing
power, 0 otherwise, i 2 I, k 2 Ui, j 2 Bik, v 2 {S, F   , F  }
T vikj equals 1 if the permanent fault in i is cleared by a device v in k, there
is an IS in j, and the IS operates with a TS, 0 otherwise, i 2 I, k 2 Ui,
j 2 Di, v 2 {R,F   , F  , CB}
Gvikj equals 1 if the permanent fault in i is cleared by a device v in k, there
is an IS in j, and the IS operates with a DG, 0 otherwise, i 2 I, k 2 Ui,
j 2 Di, v 2 {R,F   , F  , CB}
From this point forward, the following notation will be used for brevity: 8(i, k) will
be used to mean 8i 2 I, 8k 2 Ui.
7.1.2 Protection Capabilities of Each Device
Each protective device has a specific role or function for system protection and
therefore di↵erent impact to overall reliability. Table 7.1 is provided to indicate the
fault clearing and restoration operations that are modeled for each protective device
type. The mathematical model for reliability of each device and coordination with
other devices is further discussed in Section 7.2.
7.1.3 Graph Representation of Distribution Systems
In a conventional radial distribution feeder topology, power flows unidirectionally
from the substation to the loads. The structure can be described by a tree graph with
nodes representing distribution line segments and edges representing the physical
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Table 7.1: Protection Capabilities of Devices
Operation CB R S F  F  IS
temporary fault clearing x x - x - -
permanent fault clearing x x - x x -
automatic reclosing - x - - - -
upstream restoration - - x - - x
downstream restoration, tie switch - - - - - x
downstream restoration, islanding - - - - - x
connection between nodes. The graph representation allows for e cient preprocess-
ing of the data and formulation of the optimal allocation problem as a mixed-integer
linear program.
In order to model protective device operations as an MILP, the sets of nodes im-
pacted in each fault scenario due to protective device operations must be generated.
In each fault scenario, a fault occurs at node i. Di↵erent nodes and customers are
isolated depending on which protection devices operate to clear the fault. Four sets
of nodes are defined to aid the formulation in the objective function. These four
sets, Ui, Di, Bik, and B0ik, are illustrated in Fig. 7.1.
Set Ui is simply the set of nodes between the fault at node i and the feeder source.
These nodes describe possible locations of protective devices that can clear the fault.
Set Di is the set of nodes downstream of and including faulted node i and represents
customers in outage due to the fault. Set Bik is the set of nodes downstream of a
recloser at k and upstream of a fault at i and represents possible locations for
sectionalizing devices that coordinate with the recloser. Therefore, nodes not in the
shortest path between k and i are not included in Bik. Similarly, set B0ik is the set of
nodes downstream to protective device in k but not downstream of node i and these
nodes represent customers impacted by recloser momentary operations. Therefore,
nodes in all connected branches are included in B0ik, unlike in Bik.
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ijk
(a) Ui
ijk
(b) Di
ijk
(c) Bik
ijk
(d) B0ik
Figure 7.1: For a fault at node i in an example radial feeder, the four sets of nodes
shown in (a)-(d) are used to model the impact of protective device operations.
Shaded nodes are included in the set.
7.1.4 Feasible Sets for Restoration Operations
After a fault is cleared, healthy sections of the distribution feeder may be auto-
matically restored from TS and DG islanding operations. Prior to solving the op-
timization problem, the set of feasible nodes for location of isolating switches are
first determined where such operations satisfy conditions for coordination with DGs
and TSs. For restoration from an alternate feeder, there has to be at least one TS
downstream to the IS. For restoration from intentional islanding with DGs, a strat-
egy similar to [104] is followed. First there must be at least one DG downstream
of IS, and the product of the sum of DG capacities downstream to the IS and the
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utilization should be greater than the sum of the loads in corresponding nodes. The
proposed formulation considers a fixed location of DGs and TSs, and the approach
pre-processes the system data to determine feasible locations for ISs meeting the
above conditions.
7.2 Proposed Formulation
The objective function (7.1) considers monetary costs incurred to customers from
momentary and sustained interruptions resulting from both permanent and tem-
porary faults, in addition to installation and maintenance costs of the protection
devices and ISs. The formulation aims to determine the type and location of
protective devices, sectionalizers, and ISs that minimize the sum of costs to cus-
tomers and the utility. Permanent interruption costs to customers are calculated
by the reliability index ECOST and momentary interruption costs are calculated by
MAIFIe ⇥ $/interruption.
7.2.1 Objective Function
The objective function (7.1) is composed of E[CT ], the expected cost due to tempo-
rary faults, E[CP ], the expected cost due to permanent faults, and CD, the cost due
to device installation and maintenance. Binary decision variables xvk equal one if a
device v is installed in node k and zero otherwise. Decision variables yvik, S
v
ikj , T
v
ikj
and Gvikj are introduced to model device operations based on their location specified
by xvk.
min E[CT ] + E[CP ] + CD (7.1)
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The costs of temporary faults are first modeled. When a temporary fault occurs, it
can be cleared by a CB, recloser or fuse-blowing fuse. Therefore, the expected cost
due to temporary faults, CT , is composed of three components as shown below in
(7.2).
E[CT ] =
X
i2I
 i
⇥
bCBi + b
R
i + b
F  
i
⇤
(7.2)
where,
bCB =
X
k2Ui
y CBik
⇣ X
j2Dk
C j (r
 )Nj
⌘
(7.3a)
bR =
X
k2Ui
y Rik
⇣ X
j2Di
C j (r
 )Nj +
X
j2B0ik
C jmNj
⌘
(7.3b)
bF
 
=
X
k2Ui
y F
 
ik
X
j2Dk
C j (r
F  
ik )Nj (7.3c)
(7.3a) indicates if a temporary fault in node i is cleared by a CB in node k, then all
the customers downstream to the CB will su↵er permanent outage. Equation (7.3b)
illustrates that for a temporary fault at i, if a recloser is located in Ui and clears
the fault, customers downstream to the recloser in B0ik have momentary outage.
Equation (7.3c) illustrates that when the temporary fault is cleared by a fuse-blowing
fuse in Ui, customers downstream to the su↵er sustained outage.
For permanent faults, clearing can be accomplished by either a CB, recloser, or
fuse, after which automatic sectionalizing or restoration can occur. Therefore, the
expected cost due to permanent faults, CP , is expressed in (7.4).
E[CP ] =
X
i2I
 i
h
cdevi   cseci   cresi
i
(7.4)
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The cost of a device clearing a permanent fault cdev is defined in (7.5).
cdev =
X
k2Ui
y CBik
X
j2Dk
C j (r
CB 
ik )Nj (7.5a)
+
X
k2Ui
y Rik
✓ X
j2B0ik
C jmNj +
X
j2Dk
C j (r
R 
ik )Nj
◆
(7.5b)
+
X
k2Ui
y F
 
ik
X
j2Dk
C j (r
F 
ik )Nj (7.5c)
+
X
k2Ui
y F
 
ik
X
j2Dk
C j (r
F  
ik )Nj (7.5d)
Similar to (7.2), for every fault in node i, devices that can clear the fault must be
located in Ui. Therefore, (7.5a) through (7.5d) indicate when a permanent fault
is cleared by a CB, all the customers downstream to CB su↵er from permanent
outage. When a permanent fault is cleared by a recloser, all customers downstream
to the recloser have sustained outage, and customers between the recloser and fault
also have momentary outage. When a permanent fault is cleared by a fuse-saving
fuse, customers downstream to the fuse-saving fuse have sustained outage. When
a permanent fault is cleared by fuse-blowing fuse, customers downstream to the
fuse-blowing fuse have sustained outage.
Note that the cost in (7.5) does not include the outage costs saved due to section-
alizing and restoration operations. The outage costs saved due to sectionalizing
operation are defined in (7.6).
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csec =
X
k2Ui
X
j2Bik
SSikj
⇣ X
l2B0jk
C l (r
R 
ik )Nl
⌘
(7.6a)
+
X
k2Ui
X
j2Bik
SF
 
ikj
⇣ X
l2B0ij
C l mNl +
X
l2Dk
C l (r
R 
ik )Nl
⌘
(7.6b)
+
X
k2Ui
X
j2Bik
SF
 
ikj
⇣ X
l2B0ij
C l mNl +
X
l2Dk
C l (r
R 
ik )Nl
⌘
(7.6c)
(7.6a) through (7.6c) show that if the permanent fault is cleared by a recloser, and
there is a sectionalizer between the recloser and the fault, then customers down-
stream to the recloser but not downstream to sectionalizer will be protected. When
a permanent fault is cleared by a recloser and by a fuse between the recloser and
fault, then customers downstream to the recloser can be protected.
The outage costs saved due to downstream restoration from alternate feeders and
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intentional islanding operations are defined in (7.7).
cres =
X
k2Ui
X
j2Di
✓
TCBikj
X
l2Dj
C l (r
CB 
ik   rCBc )Nl
+ TRikj
X
l2Dj
C l (r
R 
ik )Nl
+ TF
 
ikj
X
l2Dj
C l (r
F  
ik   rF
 
c )Nl
+ TF
 
ikj
X
l2Dj
C l (r
F 
ik   rF
 
c )Nl
◆
(7.7a)
+
X
k2Ui
X
j2Di
✓
GCBikj
X
l2Dj
C l (r
CB 
ik   rCBc )Nl
+GRikj
X
l2Dj
C l (r
R 
ik )Nl
+GF
 
ikj
X
l2Dj
C l (r
F  
ik   rF
 
c )Nl
+GF
 
ikj
X
l2Dj
C l (r
F 
ik   rF
 
c )Nl
◆
(7.7b)
(7.7a) indicates if a permanent fault is cleared, there is an IS downstream to the
permanent fault, and there is at least one TS downstream to IS, then customers
downstream to the IS will be restored. (7.7b) means if a permanent fault is cleared,
there is an IS downstream to the permanent fault, and there are working DGs
downstream to the IS, then customers downstream to the IS will be restored.
The remaining component of the objective function is the device cost CD, shown
in (7.8). The device cost consists of the cost for reclosers, fuse-blowing fuses, fuse-
saving fuses, sectionalizers, ISs and CBs.
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CD = CR
X
k2I
xRk + CF  
X
k2I
xF
 
k + CF 
X
k2I
xF
 
k
+CS
X
k2I
xSk + CIS
X
k2I
xISk + CCB
X
k2I
xCBk (7.8)
7.2.2 Constraints
Coordination of protective devices, sectionalizers, and restoration actions is enforced
through the constraints detailed below. Constraint (7.9a) shows a CB is always
placed in the root node to protect the system. Constraints (7.9b) and (7.9c) indicate
fuses should not be used on the main line.
xCBO = 1 (7.9a)
xF
 
i = 0 8i 2ML (7.9b)
xF
 
i = 0 8i 2ML (7.9c)
Constraints (7.10a) and (7.10b) indicate that devices must be placed in a node in
order to clear faults downstream of that node.
ytvik  xvk 8(i, k), t 2 { , }, v 2 {R,F   , CB}
(7.10a)
y F
 
ik  xF
 
k 8(i, k) (7.10b)
Constraint (7.11) ensures the most downstream recloser upstream to a fuse also
operates for a permanent fault.
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y vij  y Rik +(1 +
X
l2Bjk {k}
xRl   xRk )
8(i, k), j 2 Bik, v 2 {F   , F  } (7.11)
Constraint (7.12a) forces each permanent fault to be cleared by at least one device
(CB, recloser, fuse-blowing fuse or fuse-saving fuse) and constraint (7.12b) forces
each temporary fault to be cleared by a CB, recloser, or fuse-blowing fuse.
X
k2Ui
y Rik +
X
k2Ui
y F
 
ik +
X
k2Ui
y F
 
ik +
X
k2Ui
y CBik   1 8(i, k)
(7.12a)X
k2Ui
y Rik +
X
k2Ui
y F
 
ik +
X
k2Ui
y CBik = 1 8(i, k)
(7.12b)
Constraint (7.13a) allows at most one device in each node. Constraints (7.13b) and
(7.13c) control the total device cost and the total number of devices of each type,
respectively.
xRi + x
F  
i + x
F 
i + x
S
i + x
IS
i + x
CB
i  1 8i (7.13a)X
i2I
X
v2V
Cvx
v
i  B (7.13b)X
i2I
xvi  nv 8v 2 V (7.13c)
Constraints (7.14a)–(7.14c) control sectionalizing device operations and coordina-
tion with other devices. Constraints (7.14a) to (7.14b) indicate that only when a
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sectionalizer or fuse is placed in node j, and the recloser in node k clears the fault in
node i, can Sikj be nonzero. Constraint (7.14c) requires that only if the permanent
fault in i is cleared by a fuse in j, can Sikj be nonzero.
Svikj  xvj 8(i, k), j 2 Bik, v 2 {S, F   , F  } (7.14a)
Svikj  y Rik 8(i, k), j 2 Bik, v 2 {S, F   , F  } (7.14b)
Svikj  y vij 8(i, k), j 2 Bik, v 2 {F   , F  } (7.14c)
Constraints (7.15a) and (7.15b) control IS locations and coordination with other
devices for downstream restoration from TSs. (7.15a) and (7.15b) make sure that
only when there is an IS in j and a permanent fault in i is cleared by a recloser or
fuse in k, can Tikj be nonzero.
T vikj  xISj 8(i, k), j 2 Di, v 2 {R,F   , F  , CB} (7.15a)
T vikj  y vik 8(i, k), j 2 Di, v 2 {R,F   , F  , CB} (7.15b)
Constraints (7.16a) and (7.16b) control IS locations and coordination with other
devices for downstream restoration from intentional islanding. (7.16a) and (7.16b)
ensure only when there is an IS in j and a permanent fault in i is cleared by a
recloser or fuse in k, can Gikj be nonzero.
Gvikj  xISj 8(i, k), j 2 Di, v 2 {R,F   , F  , CB} (7.16a)
Gvikj  y vik 8(i, k), j 2 Di, v 2 {R,F   , F  , CB} (7.16b)
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Constraints (7.17a)–(7.17c) requires that only one sectionalizing switch operates per
restoration operation after a fault. Constraint (7.17a) indicates that for a permanent
fault in i and a reacting recloser in k, there can be at most one operating sectionalizer
or fuse in each path between the recloser and permanent fault. Constraint (7.17b)
indicates that in each branch downstream to a permanent fault, there can be at most
one IS working with a TS. (7.17c) indicates that in each branch downstream to a
permanent fault, there can be at most one IS working with an intentional island.
Svikj 1  Sv
0
ikd
8(i, k), j 2 Bik, d 2 Bij   {j}, v, v0 2 {S, F   , F  } (7.17a)
T vikd 1  T vikj
8(i, k), j 2 Di, d 2 Dj   {j}, v 2 {R,F   , F  , CB} (7.17b)
Gvikd 1 Gvikj
8(i, k), j 2 Di, d 2 Dj   {j}, v 2 {R,F   , F  , CB} (7.17c)
Constraints (7.18a) and (7.18b) require that if a fuse at k is the closest protective
device upstream to a fault at i, then the fuse at k clears the fault at i, unless the
fuse is fuse-saving and the fault is temporary.
y F
 
jk   y F
 
ik  
X
l2Bjk {k}
X
v2{R,F ,F  }
xvl
8(i, k), j 2 Di (7.18a)
ytF
 
jk   yt
0F  
ik  
X
l2Bjk {k}
X
v2{R,F  }
xvl
8(i, k), j 2 Di, t, t0 2 { , } (7.18b)
114
Constraint (7.19) restricts all variables to be binary.
x, y, S, T,G 2 {0, 1} (7.19)
The proposed formulation is derived such that additional constraints or operating
conditions can be modeled similarly to the constraints shown above if required.
7.3 Case study: 10-node feeder
The first case study is performed on a small modified 10-node system with data
such as overhead line failure rates and average connected load, from [97]. There is
a TS to an alternate feeder in node 41 and a 800kW DG in node 32. The costs are
scaled and are set as follows: CCB = 0.5, CR = 20, CF   = CF  = 0.5, CS = 10 and
CIS = 5.5. The number of devices available is unlimited, except that only one CB
is allowed.
The following assumptions are made. First, the switching time of automated sec-
tionalizing devices is 5 min. Next, the component failure rate of overhead lines
is taken to be 0.065 (f/yr/km). Further, the repair time of all overhead lines are
considered to be 5 hrs. and fuse repair times are 1.1 hrs. After a fault is detected
and cleared, the sectionalizer can open and the breaker reclose to allow restoration
of all points between the supply and the sectionalizer. This is considered to be the
switching time. The temporary failure rate is assumed to be 4 times that of the
permanent failure rate.
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7.3.1 Example Solution and Analysis
An example solution using the proposed formulation is shown in Fig. 7.2 with the
budget is set to B = 45. It can be observed that a CB is placed at the root node
11 and a recloser in node 12. Fuse-blowing fuses are placed in node 21 and 22
and a fuse-saving fuse coordinated with the upstream recloser is placed in node 31.
Isolating switches are placed in 14 and 32, allowing restoration from alternate feeders
and intentional islands, respectively. A sectionalizer is placed in node 13 allowing
coordination with the recloser for automatic upstream restoration. An analysis of
the MILP model for this solution follows below.
The y variables indicate that a temporary fault in node 11 is cleared by the CB in
11. The temporary faults in node 21 and 22 are cleared by fuse-blowing fuses in
node 21 and 22, respectively. The temporary faults in all the other nodes are cleared
by the recloser in node 12. For permanent faults, the CB in node 11 clears the fault
in its own node. The recloser in node 12 clears the permanent faults in all the nodes
except 11. fuse-blowing fuses in node 21 and 22 clear the permanent fault in node
21 and 22 respectively. The fuse-saving fuse in node 31 detects the permanent fault
in node 31 and 32. The S variables show that the sectionalizer and all the fuses are
working with the recloser in node 12 if the permanent fault is in the node where
the fuse (or sectionalizer) is located or in the downstream nodes without a fuse (or
sectionalizer).
The x variables show that ISs are placed in node 14 and 32. The T variables control
operation of these ISs for restoration from alternate feeders and indicate that for
permanent upstream faults in nodes 11, 12, 13 and 14 cleared by the CB in node
11 or the recloser in node 12, the IS in node 14 can restore downstream nodes from
the tie switch in node 41. Furthermore, the G variables control operation of ISs
for restoration from intentional islands. There is an 800 kW DG in node 32, with
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Figure 7.2: Solution of modified 10-node example with budget of 45 units.
a utilization u = 0.8, and a load in node 32 of 100 kW. Therefore, the IS in node
32 can be opened after fault clearing by devices in node 11, 12 and 31 allowing
restoration by the DG in node 32, as 100 < 800 ⇥ 0.8. The final result shows the
device cost is 43, fault cost is 503.74, and the total cost is 546.74.
7.3.2 Impact of Varying Budget
In this section, the proposed formulation is solved with same data as in the previous
sections, except with a varying budget. The objective is to find the relationship
between the device cost and fault cost, and to further explore how device cost, fault
117
Figure 7.3: Cost – Budget Plot of modified 10-node system.
cost, and total cost change with the budget. Fig. 7.3 shows the expected costs due
to faults decreases as more devices are allowed in the system resulting in increasing
device costs. This is an intuitive result indicating that as more protective devices
are allocated, the fewer loads are isolated from fault clearing operations. Fig. 7.3
also indicates that as the budget increases, the total expected cost of reliability
(the sum of device cost and fault cost) will decrease. The higher budget enables
larger expenditures on protective devices, thus reducing the fault cost. Furthermore,
higher budget can be interpreted as a looser constraint, which will lead to a better
objective function value.
7.3.3 Impact of DG Location and Capacity
Larger DG installations in any particular node will allow more loads to be restored
by islanding after a fault clearing operation. However, the location and capacity
of the DG will alter the optimal solution for placement of protective devices. In
this section, the impact of DG location and capacity on the expected total cost of
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Figure 7.4: Impact of the capacity and location of a single DG on the objective
function, total expected cost of reliability.
reliability is explored.
First, the budget is fixed at B = 45, corresponding to the example solution in Section
7.3.1, except with the TS in node 41 removed so that downstream restoration can
only be supplied by DGs. The objective function value for the optimal solution at
this baseline case is 666.28. A DG sized at a specific capacity is then added to a single
node, and the optimization is solved obtaining a new optimal solution of protective
device and switch allocations and a new objective function value. The same DG is
then moved to a di↵erent node and the procedure is repeated sequentially for all
nodes and DG capacities ranging from 0 to 1800 kW. The objective function value
is then plotted against DG capacity and node location in Fig. 7.4.
It can be observed that in some nodes, e.g., nodes 13, 14, 15 and 41, the expected
total cost of reliability decreases monotonically with DG capacity. In node 15 for
example, placing a DG of only size 400 kW can lower the objective at the optimal
solution by approximately 8%. This result indicates that having larger capacity of
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DGs in these particular nodes can have a positive impact on the optimal reliability
allocation, even for a fixed protection budget. It can also be observed in Fig. 7.4,
that for some nodes the objective function value at the optimal solution does not
change and is fixed at the baseline value of 668.28. For example, consider a DG
placed in node 31. With large enough capacity, an island can be formed by placing
an IS in upstream node 12. However, the proposed formulation determines that it is
optimal to have a recloser in 12 instead. This result is intuitive as the recloser can
clear all temporary faults downstream of node 12. Therefore, the optimal solution
will not change even if DG capacities in such nodes are very large.
Finally, a similar study is performed locating DGs of the same capacity in three
nodes simultaneously. For this 10-node system, there are subsequently 120 combi-
nations of three node triplets. It can be observed from Fig. 7.5 that the objective
can be significantly reduced by placing three DGs of 500 kW in the appropriate
nodes. As with the single node case, placing DGs in some node triplets will not
result in an improved optimal device allocation. The results in this section show
the advantages of the proposed MILP formulation, allowing e cient comparison of
multiple DG scenarios.
7.4 Case Study: 58-Node RBTS System
In this section, a case study is performed on a larger system for the 58-Node RBTS
system to compare the solutions with prior formulations. The system contains 51
possible device locations, 7 possible CB locations, and 67 line segments or edges. It
represents a substation supplying 7 radial feeders. Loads are connected at 38 di↵er-
ent load points for a total of 4779 customers. The system data, such as interruption
costs to customers, device costs, the probability of faults in each node, is provided
in [102,105–107].
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Figure 7.5: Impact of the capacity and location of three DGs of the same size on
the total expected cost of reliability. A total of 120 node triplets are shown.
7.4.1 Comparison of Solutions
The proposed approach is first solved using the same device constraints as in prior
works, i.e., allowing only a specified number of circuit breakers and isolating switches.
The optimal solution is computed with an objective function value of 1762.27, de-
vice cost of 70, and fault cost of 1692. In comparison with the proposed approach,
referred to as MILP*, solutions from prior works are shown in Table 7.2. For ex-
ample, in comparison with the solution in [105], which uses metahueristic search
approaches particle swarm optimization (PSO) and simulated annealing (SA), the
proposed approach finds an improved solution. All methods shown in the com-
parison use a formulation with ECOST as the reliability metric in their respective
objective functions.
The proposed formulation is solved again to show the impact to momentary inter-
ruptions by now allowing reclosers and sectionalizers. It should be noted that the
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Table 7.2: Comparison with prior solutions For 58-Node System
Method Switches Total Cost Fault Cost Device Cost
MILP [106] 12 1875.71 1805 70
PSO [105] 12 1854.70 1784 70
SA [105] 14 1801.04 1720 81
MILP [99] 12 1786.24 1716 70
MILP [99] 14 1775.42 1694 81
MILP* 12 1762.27 1692 70
MILP** 12 671.03 487 183
prior formulations in Table 7.2 do not have this capability. The results are shown in
Fig. 7.6 and Table 7.2, as MILP**, for the allocation of seven reclosers and twelve
IS or sectionalizers. The size of each node is proportional to the product of the cost
of permanent faults, load, and probability of faults. The optimal solution from the
proposed algorithm is shown in the shaded circles. For comparison, the solution
from [99] using an MILP formulation is shown with the cross markings to the right
of each node.
It can be observed that many of the device locations are similar, however, circuit
breakers have been replaced by reclosers for each feeder. Further, the proposed
formulation includes the cost of both temporary and permanent faults in addition
to considering sectionalizers. The result is a lower objective function value and a
better allocation of switches and sectionalizers at nodes where costs are high. It
can be observed that the ISs are placed in the nodes with the highest cost, allowing
downstream restoration. For example, the prior solution places ISs at nodes 6,
31, and 39, however, the total cost at each load is relatively low. The proposed
formulation more appropriately places ISs in 30 and 40, in addition to a sectionalizer
at node 47, allowing upstream restoration.
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Figure 7.6: MILP** solution in RBTS Bus 4 test system allowing for circuit breakers,
reclosers, sectionalizers, and ISs. A maximum of 12 ISs or sectionalizers are allowed
and the device budget constraint has been removed. The comparison with a prior
solution is shown with a plus sign next to each node.
7.5 Summary
An MILP formulation for protective device and switch allocation in distribution
systems considering intentional islanding with distributed generation has been pre-
sented. The contribution is a formulation modeling the specific impact of each
protection device (circuit breaker, recloser, sectionalizer, fuse) and isolating switch
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type. The proposed approach is facilitated by representing the distribution system
as a directed graph allowing e cient pre-processing of the network data. Numerical
tests are performed on 10-node and 58-node feeders and shows computation of the
optimal solution with improved objective function values. Furthermore, formula-
tion as an MILP allows e cient computation of optimal solutions for multiple DG
scenarios.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
Protective relays continue to play a critical role in the power system at all levels,
including generation, transmission, and distribution. Because these devices control
the actuation of circuit breakers, relays must operate with high reliability and selec-
tively isolate faulted sections. Furthermore, power systems are growing in complex-
ity and operating with additional uncertainty from increasing renewable generation.
The research presented in this dissertation aims to improve power system protection
under uncertainty while leveraging the increased computational power available to
relays. The work focuses on both transmission and distribution protection. In this
final chapter, the key results and contributions are summarized.
• Model-Based Relaying Framework
A new framework has been proposed for supervising protective relay decisions
by integrating the capability to quickly run circuit model simulations at the
local relay level. The proposed method works in parallel with and supervises
conventional distance relaying algorithms to improve discrimination between
3-phase faults and stressed conditions. Utilizing measurements of bus voltage
magnitudes from adjacent buses, the proposed algorithm compares measured
values with possible fault scenarios. The relay’s trip or block decision is super-
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vised and validated by real-time simulation results to maintain coordination
with other relays. Simulation results in PSCAD demonstrate that the pro-
posed framework has the potential to prevent undesired operation of remote
backup relays during load encroachment, voltage instability, and power swings.
A hardware prototype has been developed and tested a power system test-bed,
demonstrating the capability of the approach.
• Supervised Learning for Symmetrical Fault Detection During Power Swings
A supervised learning approach using e↵ective feature selection criteria is pro-
posed to augment discrimination of symmetrical faults during power swings.
The approach is evaluated on power swing and fault scenario data from the
IEEE 9-Bus system in PSCAD/EMTDC, consisting of scenarios where power
swings enter zone 1 and where conventional relays are likely to fail. The anal-
ysis shows ensemble approaches using decision tree classifiers, such as random
forest and gradient tree boosting, have better performance than other clas-
sifiers presented in literature. The approach further emphasizes analyzing
the classifier’s predicted probabilities and trade-o↵s between true-positive and
false-positive rates instead of relying solely on the binary decision, resulting
in a more interpretable model with similar performance.
• Stochastic Optimization of Discrete Overcurrent Characteristics
A stochastic mixed-integer linear program (MILP) is proposed to minimize
a relay’s tripping time at discrete fault current intervals. The formulation
takes into account the probabilistic nature of the fault current observed at
each relay, which can be impacted by fault location, fault resistance, breaker
failure, and DG output. Monte Carlo simulation is used to determine the
empirical probabilities of each relay observing a particular fault current. The
resulting MILP is shown to have fast solution times even for large systems
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and thousands of fault scenarios. This allows for adaptive relaying to change
tripping characteristics based on fault current probabilities. Compared to
prior approaches, the proposed method results in an optimal solution with
an average decrease of 10% in expected energy disconnected due to faults for
10,000 Monte Carlo fault scenarios.
• Optimal Allocation of Protective Devices in Distribution Systems
A new MILP formulation is developed for allocating protective devices in dis-
tribution systems that comprehensively considers factors impacting reliability.
The contribution includes improved computational tractability for large net-
works and allocation of multiple device types. The specific impact of each
protection device (circuit breaker, recloser, sectionalizer, fuse) and isolating
switch type is modeled, and the impact of residential distributed generators
are modeled to allow islanding. Numerical tests are performed on 10-node
and 58-node feeders and shows computation of the optimal solution with im-
proved objective function values. Furthermore, formulation as an MILP allows
e cient computation of optimal solutions for multiple DG scenarios.
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